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Is it possible to attain meaning in art? And what exactly are we asking with this 
question? Edgar Wind’s entire research activity can probably be considered as a 
continuous confrontation with these two problems, as an attempt to define what it is to 
call an object a work of art, as an endeavour to determine the boundaries of a possible 
artistic experience, to investigate the cognitive aspects which enable us to circumscribe 
a ‘phenomenon of art’. This perspective may at first appear to be an explicit call for an 
absolutely rational approach to the world of art. As I will show in this article, it is not. 
From Wind’s early work, on which I am focussing in this article, it will become 
clear that his proposal is much more a transcendental investigation into our way of 
considering what we call art. Better put, it is a transcendental definition of the a priori 
conditions of our experience of artistic phenomena. Bearing in mind Immanuel Kant’s 
transcendental foundation of a real world of phenomena, Wind tries to provide the 
bases for a transcendental foundation of our approach to art, to organize it into a 
reliable system which could enable us to establish a real world of artistic phenomena 
and to have access to it, preserving its particularity. This article aims at a critical 
reading of Edgar Wind’s early work, to unearth the deep roots of his thought and to 
bring to light the important philosophical and methodological questions at the basis of 
his work. The focussing on Wind’s investigation of some Riegelian key concepts  has 
several justifications. The most obvious is that Wind regards Alois Riegl’s work as the 
first decisive contribution towards a redefinition of art history as an autonomous 
discipline governed by original rules.  
It is well-known that, in the second decade of the twentieth century, the 
discipline of art history was almost exclusively dominated by a concern for form. 
Heinrich Wölfflin’s entire work may be defined as a search for a principle which could 
enable him to interpret a work of art and yet give an account of the transformation of 
art. He was looking for a constant which could justify the changes in style. Following 
Wind’s considerations, the risk which the art historians incurred was to commit 
themselves to a too formal, psychological or physiological approach, as for instance in 
the case of Wölfflin. 
In Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden Kunst (1915) and Der Begriﬀ des 
Kunstwollens (1920),1
 
*This paper originally formed part of my doctoral dissertation Knowledge, History and Art in the early Work 
of Edgar Wind (1922-1929), University of Pisa, 2007/2008. My supervisors were Dr. Jas Elsner Oxford), Prof. 
Alfredo Ferrarin (Pisa) and Prof. Martin Kemp (Oxford).   
 Erwin Panofsky demonstrated that Wölfflin’s concepts were 
dependent upon empirical observation of individual works and lacked any guarantee 
1Erwin Panofsky, ‘Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden Kunst’, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine 
Kunstwissenschaft, 10, 1915, 460-467; Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik 
und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, 14, 1920, 321-339. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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that such observations were critically pertinent. ‘The problem was to turn those 
remarks about visible and historical objects into interpretative remarks about works of 
art. Panofsky attempted to construct such an authoritative viewpoint, one which 
would show how the various factors within a work of art cohered and the work took 
on the distinctive meaning qua work of art’.2
For a critically relevant investigation of art, as Panofsky conceived it,  content 
and form, the two roots of style, must be considered in their inevitable interrelation, in 
their unitary common sense (Sinn), which is immanent in art, as the transcendental 
condition of our approach to art, and which must be investigated by means of 
transcendental categories that are specific for art interrogation and different from the 
causal nexus, which must rather be used for the investigation of the natural 
phenomena. According to Panofsky, the coherent unity and the unitary character that 
we recognize in an artistic phenomenon, or in a certain style or between different 
styles, does not derive from a principle inherent in the artistic objects or styles, and 
cannot therefore be obtained and explained by investigating their merely material or 
merely formal aspects. Rather, the unity and the unitary character that we recognize in 
an artistic phenomenon must be sought in our way of approaching art. And this, again, 
as for Kant in relation to the investigation of nature and of our knowledge in general, 
must necessarily be based, in the particular case of the artistic, on a transcendental 
principle of unity of the artistic experience. This unity is defined by Panofsky - 
borrowing and interpreting the famous Riegelian concept - as the Kunstwollen.
  
3
The entire analysis of Riegl’s thought carried out by Panofsky was explicitly 
related to the problem of the definition of a unitary transcendental principle which 
could act as a principle of internal coherence for art interrogation. This concept, this 
transcendental principle fundamental to a coherent art interrogation and, at the same 
time, transcendentally determinable by the categories of the Kunstwissenschaft is the 
meaning - or sense - (Sinn). It was precislely in his Der Begriff des Kunstwollens
  
4
  In Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme,
 that 
Panofky proposed to use the Riegelian conceptual pairs - first of all the haptisch-optisch 
pair - as possible categories for the determination of Kunstwollen, and it is in this 
context that the spark of Edgar Wind’s early reflections on art has to be sought.  
5
 
2Michael Podro, The Critical Historians of Art, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, 179. 
 Wind demonstrates that 
precisely the opposition-relation between the concepts of content and form, of fullness 
3Kunstwollen is one of the most difficult concepts in all art history, translated sometimes by ‘artistic 
volition’ or ‘formative will of art’. In order to avoid any psychological interpretation of it, I choose to leave 
the original German. On the difficulties of this concept see Allister Neher, ‘‘The Concept of Kunstwollen’, 
neo-Kantianism and Erwin Panofsky’s Early Art Theoretical Essays’, Word & Image, 20, 2004, 41-51, 
particularly on Panofsky’s transcendental approach. I agree with Neher’s observations, except for his 
reading the Panofsky’s Kunstwollen as a category and not - as I do here - as a transcendental unity. For 
further discussion and a brief account of some attempts at definition see Erwin Panofsky, (translated by 
Katharina Lorenz and Jas’ Elsner), ‘On the Relationship of Art History and Art Theory: Towards the 
Possibility of a Fundamental System of Concepts for a Science of Art’, Critical Inquiry, 35: 1, Autumn 2008, 
43-71 and Katharina Lorenz and Jas’ Elsner, ‘‘On the Relationship of Art History and Art  Theory’: 
Translators’ Introduction’, Critical Inquiry, 35: 1, Autumn 2008, 33-42. Moreover, see Jas’ Elsner, ‘From 
Empirical Evidence to the Big Picture: Some Reflections on Riegl’s Concept of Kunstwollen’, Critical 
Inquiry, 32: 4, Summer 2006, 741-766. 
4Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, 321-339. 
5Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme’, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine 
Kunstwissenschaft, 18, 1925, 438-486. Unless differently specified, all the translations in this article are mine. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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(Fülle)6 and form (Form), is the fundamental interpretative category, the Ur-problem, for 
the interrogation of the inherent meaning (Sinn, Kunstwollen) of the artwork. Against 
this background, I believe, the Windian conceptual pairs I have mentioned - i.e. the 
necessarily opposed and related concepts - reach their status of categories that are a 
priori valid. The particularity of these pairs emerges in Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft with 
the definition of the artistic problems (künstlerische Probleme), which are for Wind 
different from mathematical problems. So, as I shall show, they somehow introduce a 
difference - already implicit in Wind’s thesis, between a logical grammar and a 
grammar specific to the comprehension of the artistic, i.e. not aimed at a merely 
abstractive description of artistic events.7
 In Theory of Art versus Aesthetics Wind quotes Alois Riegl’s affirmation that the 
best art historian was the one who had no taste.
 
8 Far from being merely humorous, this 
sentence is taken quite seriously by Wind. As long as we do not identify ‘no taste’ with 
‘bad taste’ this is not paradoxical. By postulating a sharp separation between aesthetic 
pleasure and theoretical judgment, Riegl’s aphorism represents for Wind the inevitable 
conflict which every art historian experiences in his work ‘and which he must 
overcome if he intends to be a conscientious worker: the conflict between 
contemplation and analysis, between aesthetic feeling and scientific judgment’.9 
Instead of an art history based on the strong personalities or personal preferences of 
individual historians of art, Wind proposes a scientific history of art, a new discipline, 
no longer based on what impressions pictures make on human souls, but on the 
observation of works of art as a preformed material10 whose particular inherent 
coherence, immanent meaning (Sinn) needs to be respected and understood. As linking 
points between concrete material and intuitive (anschaulich) formal content,11 works of 
art need to be investigated in respect of both these premises. This drives Wind to the 
proposal of a system of a priori theoretical instruments which can be used a posteriori, 
retrospectively, in order to obtain a description of the concrete12
 
6I translate the word Fülle by the word fullness. This term means for Wind the totality of the concrete 
element of the work of art (its material and expressive content). Despite its ‘concreteness’, this term does 
not mean anything empirical and is rather to be understood as the ideal counterpart of the other element 
necessary for a critical interrogation of art: the form (Form). Together, in their indissoluble opposition-
combination (Ausgleich), fullness and form represent for Wind the fundamental interpretative category for 
art interrogation. Further on the difficulties of this word, in Panofsky’s work, see Allister Neher, ‘‘The 
Concept of Kunstwollen’’, 41-51, Erwin Panofsky, ‘On the Relationship of Art History and Art Theory’, 43-
71 and Katharina Lorenz and Jas’ Elsner, ‘Translators’ Introduction’, 33-42. 
 work of art and an 
appreciation of its particular artistic value independent from any aesthetic feeling. 
7It would be a great temptation to try to make a comparison between Wind’s project of a Kunstwissenschaft 
and Riegl’s Historische Grammatik. But this is impossible in this context, first of all because, by about 1922, 
Wind probably did not have access to the text of Riegl’s lectures which were only published in 1966, by 
K.M. Swoboda and Otto Pächt, under the title of Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste. 
8Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, The Philosophical Review, 34, 1925, 354. 
9Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 354. 
10As regards Panofsky’s and, in particular, Wind’s project of a Kunstwissenschaft, the consideration of the 
work of art as a preformed material is always a matter of transcendental reflection. In this sense, 
‘preformation’ does not have to do with individual or collective intention (on this see also supra and 
Panofsky’s Der Begriff des Kunstwollens) but, rather, with our way of approaching the nature of art. It is 
precisely after this preliminary kunst- wissenschaftlich consideration that a historical-documentary 
investigation of art - on the basis of regulative principles - can be possible. 
11Edgar Wind, Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand. Ein Beitrag zur Methodologie der 
Kunstgeschichte, (Diss. Masch.) Hamburg, 1922, 6. 
12Ideally considered as being an already given concrete combination of form and matter. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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 It is precisely in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme that Wind shows that 
every time we investigate an artwork qua artwork (and not as a merely natural object) 
we express a judgement on it in terms of form and content. We ideally set a coherent 
and balanced unity of these two elements every time we investigate art. This coherent 
unity is presupposed as a necessary general rule for art investigation. It is a general 
condition for the investigation of art, but it is also, in particular, the goal of every 
investigation of an artwork. To put it in other words, we cannot think an artistic style 
in general without presupposing a principle of unitary coherence of content and form, 
but we also cannot investigate a specific artwork without looking in it for a particular 
coherence of content and form. 
 For Wind, developing  Panofsky’s thesis, this general and particular unity, this 
unitary principle of coherence, is the Kunstwollen and represents the condition of any 
possible stylistic investigation of art, and the horizon against which styles and 
artworks can be objectively investigated, and compared, in their particular, unitary and 
coherent articulation of form and content. 
  Wind refers - explicitly and often implicitly - to the thinker-artist parallelism, 
to the need for a Kunstwissenschaft which is able to give to art interrogation the 
instruments which a linguistic grammar13 can give to the study of a language. For 
instance, Wind insists on the relation between sensuous sound and the conceptual - 
formal - content of a language. His considerations are not to be regarded as empirical. 
Rather, talking for instance about art, he shows how the sensuous and the formal 
elements, Fülle and Form, must be considered, a priori,14 as two necessary ideally 
opposed, and, at the same time, related, elements of a categorical opposition inherent 
to our way of approaching art.15
By investigating the rules of coherence of art, Wind sets a linking point between 
the work of the artist and the work of the historian of art. We could call these rules a 
kind of common language which must be respected: by the artist if he wants the free 
expression of his ideas to be understood, and by the art historian if he wants to be 
honest to the artist’s intentions and to the particularity of his work. By the 
individuation of the rules of art Wind doesn’t want to set a norm for the artist, but only 
a condition.
 
16 ‘The artistic imperative - he says - has not the categorical but the 
hypothetical form’.17
 
13See Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 350-359. 
 Wind’s art theory does not claim to say what the artist must do or 
not do; it merely postulates an internal coherence and legality (Gesetzlichkeit) of the 
artist’s free work. It merely wants to demonstrate ‘the conclusions of the artist’s free 
decision’ by analyzing the system of rules which regulates that decision, by studying 
14I would say that for Wind the determination of the meaning (Sinn) as a merely empirical consideration 
would never work, since it would never show these two opposite elements in their necessary relation and 
so it could never get over a merely emotional appreciation of art. And the same would apply for Wind 
with a merely formal approach to art: it would never get over the limits of a merely abstractive 
description. It must be noted that Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft is not merely ideal. It is a) concrete (konkret) 
and b) ideal at the same time: a) it considers also the material content, the sensuous fullness (die sinnliche 
Fülle), as a fundamental element of the artistic phenomenon; b) it considers fullness and form only in their 
ideal opposition-relation, as the two elements of a purely conceptual antithesis. 
15I have in mind here Wind’s rereading of Panofsky’s interpretation of Riegl’s haptisch-optisch opposition. 
16See Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 358. 
17Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 358. In fact, in order to respect the particularity of the 
artistic object, Wind’s transcendental Kunstwissenschaft is re-constitutive and not constitutive. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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‘the problems which make the decision necessary’.18
In this article I will show what these artistic problems are and how it is possible 
- and what it means - to have a system of them. I will try show how Wind carries out 
his plan of a systematic study of art (Kunstwissenschaft) confronting the important 
heritage of the thought of Alois Riegl. It is my ultimate intention to illustrate the 
models and the conceptual categories early developed by Wind, evidently following, 
and largely completing, Panofsky’s problematic approach, and to pay attention to how 
Wind, with his thesis, gave a fundamental theoretical contribution
  
19
I shall show how Wind’s fundamental artistic problems correspond to those 
fundamental categories of art interrogation required by Panofsky as absolutely 
necessary for the coherent investigation of art in accordance with - and for the 
determination of - the necessarily unitary principle of Kunstwollen.
 to the project of a 
transcendental foundation of art investigation - particularly of visual art investigation - 
under the light of Kunstwollen.  
20 In this way, I shall 
focus on the logical-transcendental aspects and on the specific visual character of 
Wind’s early art-investigative thesis, in order to point out the cues, the solutions, the 
unresolved difficulties and the developments of this first stage of Wind’s particular 
research methodology which, in 1950, Wind himself will define as ‘a method of 
interpreting pictures which shows how ideas are translated into images, and images 
sustained by ideas’.21
 
 By doing so, I will show that the Kunstwissenschaft developed by 
Wind has both a critical and a regulative intent and helps, as a compass, the art 
historian with their historical investigation. It does not pretend to define the essence of 
art, but shows how we can approach art without depriving it of its autonomous 
character. 
The ‘artistic problems’ (die »künstlerischen Probleme«) 
 
In order to understand what it means, for Wind, to investigate art starting from 
systematic fundamentals - i.e. within a kunstwissenschaftlich approach - it is necessary to 
carry out an in depth analysis of what he calls the ‘artistic problems’ (die »künstlerische 
Probleme«),22
Wind himself found it necessary to give an account of the particular function of 
the artistic problems at the beginning of his Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, 
distinguishing them from what he calls the ‘pre-artistic assignments’ (die 
»vorkünstlerischen Aufgaben«),
 bearing in mind that, according to him, our way of approaching art 
always rests on a necessary transcendental antithesis, a necessary polarity, an 
opposition-combination between two opposite and at the same time necessary orders: 
Fülle and Form. 
23
 
18Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 358. See also Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471-474, 
where Wind writes about the importance of his mediating scheme that is described later in this article. 
 which, according to him, consist in general aspects of 
19Accepted by Panofsky himself, see Erwin Panofsky, ‘Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur 
Kunsttheorie: ein Beitrag zu der Erörterung über die Möglichkeit „kunstwissenschaftlicher 
Grundbegriffe“’, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, 18, 1925, 129-161.  
20See Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, 321-339. 
21Application for a Guggenheim grant, 1950, Wind Archive, Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodl. 
Oxf., quotation in Ben Thomas, ‘Wind, Edgar Marcel (1900-1971)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
22Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. 
23 Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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artistic activity, such as the technique or the theme chosen for the realization of an 
artwork. In order to introduce the meaning of artistic problems - which I would call the 
‘instruments’, the interpretative categories, of Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft - I would 
summarise by saying that for Wind they consist in pairs of opposite-related 
transcendental concepts - for instance Fülle and Form - which must be used for the 
interrogation of art by regarding the work of art as a specific already given conciliation 
of their opposition. 
In order to illustrate his own concept of artistic problem, Wind takes the distances 
from the habit - frequent in his time - of defining as history by problems 
(Problemgeschichte) the research that Wölfflin himself used to define as history of art 
without names (Kunstgeschichte ohne Namen).24 Wind maintains that the analysis of 
problems does not have anything to do with the search for variations ‘‘in the use of light 
and shadows, in the perspective and the representation of space’’,25 nor with the 
indication of changes ‘‘in the portrayal of figures, dresses or trees’’.26 Rather, whoever 
carries out this kind of observation ‘still only takes care of the formal qualities of the 
artwork, of the characteristics of its outer appearance’27 and, like the botanist (wie der 
Botaniker),28 proceeds by means of descriptions and morphologic comparisons, even if 
he does not order the objects in classes by kinds and species, but on the basis of a linear 
chronological succession.29
 
 So, as Wind himself maintains,  
however necessary and unavoidable this way of observing may be for the 
progress of the formulation of systematic judgments on art, it does not directly 
touch the problems themselves, although every investigation of problems must 
move from it and must finally be able to recall to it; the appearances 
(Erscheinungen) as such are not yet ‘problems’; rather, these begin precisely 
where the ‘interpretation’ takes the place of the mere ‘description’.30
 
  
But, for Wind, there is something much more worrying than a misuse of the 
term ‘problem’ due to a lack of terminological precision. Much more worrisome for 
him is the case in which, behind the linguistic inaccuracy, there is also a substantial 
exchange between the terms of his distinction: ‘pre-artistic assignments’ and ‘artistic 
problems’. Both of them are for Wind beyond the appearances (Erscheinungen) 
 
24 Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 438. 
25 ‘»der Licht- und Schatten-behandlung, der Perspektive und Raumdarstellung«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 438. For a much more readable typographic appearance, within this article I have chosen 
always to use italic characters instead of Wind’s expanded letter-spacing for the highlighting of important 
words and expressions (both for the original German text and for the English translation). Unless 
differently specified, the italic character within quotations from Wind’s text is due to this aim. 
26‘»in der Figurenzeichnung, Gewandzeichnung, Baumzeichnung«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 438. 
27‘der befaßt sich noch lediglich mit den Gestalteigenschaften des Kunstwerks, mit den Merkmalen seiner 
äußeren Erscheinung’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 438. 
28Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 438. 
29Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 438. 
30‘So notwendig und unentbehrlich aber diese Art der Betrachtung für den Fortgang der 
kunstwissenschaftlichen Urteilsbildung ist - (jede Untersuchung von Problemen hat von ihr auszugehen 
und muß sich letzten Endes auf sie berufen können) -, mit den Problemen selbst kommt sie noch gar nicht 
in unmittelbare Berührung. Denn die Erscheinungen als solche sind noch keine »Probleme«; diese 
beginnen vielmehr erst dort, wo an die Stelle der bloßen »Schilderung« die »Deutung« tritt’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 438. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
 
  7 
themselves, although in very opposite directions.31
The first class, the pre-artistic assignments (vorkünstlerische Aufgaben), are 
obtained through the reconstruction of the facts preliminary to the artistic, which 
consist of material and ideal components: a wall of a certain dimension, inside a 
determined space, to be painted with colours in a precise combination, and a subject, a 
theme, to be represented, for instance, a battle. In this sense, as Wind himself 
maintains, both the material and the ideal components are still shapeless and 
completely non-intuitive (unanschaulich), but at the same time, for exactly this reason, 
both are suitable for use as points of comparison for different picture formations 
(Bildgestaltungen),
 
32 since it is then ‘in the position statement on the common 
preliminary conditions’ that ‘the intuitive particularity (anschauliche Besonderheit) of the 
artwork expresses itself.’33 If the documents relative to an eventual commission or a 
contest of contract are not available to us, the preliminary facts (der Tatbestand) have to 
be reconstructed from the works of art themselves through abstraction (Abstraktion), i.e. 
putting aside the specific sensuous appearance of the finished work of art, and only 
determining the technique as such,34 the choice of the topic35 and the other similar 
general aspects. Then, it is possible to refer to these abstractions the most different 
concrete formations (Gestaltungen).36
Totally different is the case of artistic problems. As I have said above, the Fülle-
Form antithesis is the fundamental artistic problem. The ideal formulation of the 
problem related to the relationship between the formal element and the element 
related to the sensuous data, to the plenum of experience, is the starting point of Wind’s 
investigation of art.
 
37 According to Wind, they represent no empirical facts at all and, 
therefore, can be determined neither through abstraction nor through reconstruction. 
Their function is to allow an interpretation of the artwork, and they must therefore 
have an origin immanent in the artistic (immanent-künstlerisch).38
They also differ structurally from the pre-artistic assignments: these last, in fact, 
acting as external points of comparison, must necessarily have a univocal or even 
schematic character, while artistic problems, as interpretative instruments, point to an 
internal division (Spaltung),
 So, the Windian 
artistic problems must have a transcendental origin, i.e. an origin immanent in our way 
of approaching and interrogating art. 
39 since ‘in order to see something as an ‘artistic 
performance’’40 we have to ‘consider it as the solution to something which was 
previously unsolved’,41
 
31Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. 
 i.e. we must ‘set a conflict which in the artistic appearance 
32Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. 
33‘In der Stellungnahme zu den gemeinsamen Vorbedingungen äußert sich die anschauliche Besonderheit’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. 
34For instance - in relation to the previous example - the fresco. 
35For instance the representation of a battle. 
36Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. 
37Moreover, it is precisely when a system of problems is found that the Kunstwissenschaft becomes a 
Systematik. 
38Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. 
39Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. 
40Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439. 
41‘Um etwas als »künstlerische Leistung« zu begreifen, muß ich es als Lösung eines vorher Ungelösten 
ansehen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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(Erscheinung) presents itself as ‘conciliated’’,42 which, more explicitly, means that ‘in the 
thought we must set the problem whose solution must be found only in the intuitive’.43
  As we have seen, the setting of a ‘problem’ means, for Wind, something like a 
transcendental activity of thought, like the formulation of a transcendental conceptual 
antithesis,
 
44 and this explains why for Wind it does not have an empirical status. The 
only way to understand the sense of Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft is to keep in mind that, 
for him, the setting of a ‘problem’ is something inherent in our way of approaching art: 
whatever the artistic object may be, the subject - the kunstwissenschaftlich transcendental 
subject - cannot do anything but approach art considering the artwork as a coherent 
combination of a material and a formal element. But both of these elements - it is 
important to recall this here - are for Wind nothing empirical: they are just two 
necessarily opposed-related elements45 constituting46 a transcendental category which 
the subject must apply in order to see - and, then, to interrogate - something as an 
artistic performance. In this sense, the artistic problems, these antithetical pairs, must 
be inherent to the artistic (immanent-künstlerisch).47
There is yet another important Windian passage which requires to be correctly 
understood and which could help in illustrating how Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft is 
supposed to work, how his conceptual transcendental devices should operate. I am 
referring to the place where Wind says that ‘therefore, the mutually opposed principles 
cannot be logical-conceptual ones’, and that, at the same time, ‘vice versa, the 
opposition itself cannot be comprised if not logically’.
 
48 Once again Wind clarifies his 
own position through a distinction, this time between two different types of problems: 
he asserts that artistic problems ‘hold in themselves an antithetical conflict which is set by 
the thought, but which is, however, not an antithetical conflict for the thought’,49 and adds 
that ‘an ‘artistic problem’ always subsists [...] - as a problem - only for the thought of a 
systematic investigation of art: nevertheless, it is an artistic problem and not a thought 
problem’.50
 
42‘einen Konflikt setzen, der sich in der künstlerischen Erscheinung als »versöhnt« darstellt’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 440. 
 The following, Wind’s own example, sheds light on this difficult passage:  
43‘Im Denken muß also das Problem gesetzt sein, dessen Lösung nur im Anschaulichen zu finden ist’, Edgar 
Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440. As to an interpretative translation of this Windian passage, it can be worth 
referring to what Silvia Ferretti writes in her Silvia Ferretti, ‘Edgar Wind: dalla filosofia alla storia 
dell'arte’, La Cultura, 1991, 349: ‘La soluzione del problema artistico si trova solo nell'intuitivo, ma il 
problema in se stesso, il conflitto presente nell'attività artistica, deve essere posto in sede logica’ (transl: 
‘The solution to the artistic problem lies only in the intuitive, but the problem in itself, i.e. the conflict 
present in the artistic activity, must be set in the logical field’). 
44For this, see also further in this article and Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458. 
45Considered in their pureness (Reinheit). This also explains the reason why Wind maintains that ‘the 
totality of what is artistic belongs to the region of the concrete-intuitive, so the antithetical conflict must 
refer to this intuitive sphere’ (‘alles Künstlerische aber der konkret-anschaulichen Region angehört, so 
muß sich die Antithetik auf eben diese anschauliche Sphäre beziehen’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440. 
46Exactly in their being opposed and, at the same time, necessarily related. 
47‘Da nun dieser Konflikt ein immanent-künstlerischer sein soll’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440. 
48‘die Prinzipien, die miteinander im Widerstreit liegen, dürfen also keine logisch-begrifflichen sein’ and 
‘umgekehrt kann aber der Widerstreit selbst nicht anders als logisch verstanden werden’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 440. 
49‘schließen eine vom Denken gesetzte Antithetik in sich, die dennoch keine Antithetik für das Denken ist’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440. 
50‘ein »künstlerisches Problem« besteht [...] - als Problem - immer nur für das kunstwissenschaftliche 
Denken: dennoch ist es aber ein künstlerisches Problem und kein Denkproblem’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 440. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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Every mathematical problem is set by the mathematical thought for the 
mathematical thought, so that the ‘problem’ constitutes the first thesis to which 
the further thought refers. On the other hand, an ‘artistic problem’ is set by the 
thought of the systematic study of art for the artistic work, - not in such way that the 
problem precedes the solution, but, on the contrary, so that the problem is just 
sought-after - by means of a reflection - for the interpretation of the solution. So, it 
happens the paradoxical case that given the solution - i.e. the artwork51 - the 
problem is posed, - posed so that the solution is conceived as ‘solution’.52
 
 
It is important to bear in mind the particular meaning of this passage: Wind 
here confronts the fact that the work of art is a given object which has to be 
investigated. His strategy is to see it, retrospectively, as if it were the solution of an 
unsolved conceptual antithetical problem made up of the categorical opposition Fülle-
Form, the a priori instrument which we cannot help applying transcendentally in the 
interrogation of art. Nevertheless, at precisely this point, the difficulty of claiming a 
parallel between logical grammar and kunstwissenschaftlich grammar arises. Wind 
himself admits the difficulty of claiming to investigate the meaning of real objects with 
merely - albeit transcendental - instruments. As it appears from this passage, the work 
of art - the solution, as Wind calls it - does not belong to the conceptual world, although 
we try to investigate it in accordance with our particular point of view. In fact, 
although something - for instance an artistic object - can be seen as a solution to an ideal 
opposition, this solution itself is never conceptual, i.e. it is always absolutely different 
compared to thought. It is exactly this problematic relation between our ideas and the 
object we try to interpret that marks the starting point for Wind’s further developments 
of his own theory, for his encounter with American pragmatism and the new way of 
reading Kant considering the mutual interaction between a priori structures and given 
facts of experience.53
However, on these premises, I think it is evident why for Wind the procedure 
 
 
51Seen as a solution to the fullness-form problem. 
52‘Jedes mathematische Problem wird vom mathematischen Denken für das mathematische Denken 
gestellt, und zwar derart, daß das »Problem« die Anfangsthese ist, an welche das weitere Denken 
anknüpft. Ein »künstlerisches Problem« dagegen wird vom kunstwissenschaftlichen Denken für das 
künstlerische Schaffen angesetzt, - aber nicht derart, daß das Problem der Lösung vorhergeht, sondern so, daß 
es zur Deutung der Lösung erst gesucht wird. Es liegt also der paradoxe Fall vor, daß die Lösung gegeben, 
das Problem aufgegeben ist, - aufgegeben, damit die Lösung als »Lösung« begriffen werde’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 440. 
53The experimental way, as I would describe Wind’s further theories, leads to a new conception of the role of 
the investigative instruments. Wind’s instruments will no longer be ideal but physical: the validity of our 
ideal hypotheses on our non ideal world (either physical or artistic) will be tested exactly in their 
applicability in an instrument belonging to the absolutely non ideal world. The physicist investigates the 
world in this way: if his hypothesis is able to be embodied in an instrument, i.e. if an instrument is 
constructed in accordance with his theory, his theory itself will reveal itself as valid. Wind will illustrate 
how this particular approach based on the use of historical - rather than ideal - instruments, this jump from 
ideality into history, is possible and even necessary for the investigation of both historical documents and 
artistic objects as well. On this see Wind in Edgar Wind, ‘Experiment and Metaphysics’, Proceedings of the 
Sixth International Congress of Philosophy at Harvard University ..., 1926, Brightman, 1927, 217-224, and in 
Edgar Wind, Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomien, Tübingen: 
Mohr/Siebeck, 1934. New German ed.: Edgar Wind, Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. Zur Auflösung der 
kosmologischen Antinomien, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001. English transl.: Edgar Wind, Experiment and 
Metaphysics. Towards a Resolution of the Cosmological Antinomies, Oxford: European Humanities Research 
Center of the University of Oxford, Legenda, 2001. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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for the setting of the ‘artistic problems’ cannot be reconstructive or based on an 
abstraction.54 Certainly, this procedure cannot be the result of a pure - I would say 
‘elaborative’ - thought unfolding in itself, as the thought which - according to Wind’s 
example - is at the basis of the formulation of mathematical problems. Rather, the 
‘artistic problems’ are the result of a speculative reflection (spekulative Reflexion), of a 
thought which ‘from ready given facts ‘goes back’ to problems’,55 and which ‘for the 
interpretation of the appearances tries to go beyond them and does not ‘abstract’ from the 
appearances’.56
In this paragraph, I have tried to outline the fundamental aspects of the two 
opposite methods of art interrogation described by Wind. I have shown how for Wind 
the abstractive reconstruction (abstraktive Rekonstruktion)
 
57 only reaches the definition of 
the pre-artistic assignments, while the speculative reflection (spekulative Reflexion)58
 
 sets the 
artistic problems, the instruments which enable the interpretation of the artwork, i.e. 
which enable us to consider it in its unitary coherence and attain its inherent meaning 
(Sinn). I have shown how Wind focusses on the speculative reflection, on the production 
of a conceptual antithesis to which the work of art can be seen as a particular solution, 
on the study of the antitheses aimed at the interpretation. What I shall try to show in 
the next paragraph is how Wind problematically refers to Riegl’s thought for the 
definition of the instruments and of the principle of his own transcendental approach. 
The two Riegl’s visions of history: significance (Bedeutsamkeit) and 
effectiveness (Wirksamkeit). 
 
In Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme,59 Wind refers several times to Alois Riegl. 
In particular, he points out as a fundamental characteristic of Riegl’s thought the 
tendency to identify ‘latent oppositions’ (»latente Gegensätze«), ‘problems requiring 
reconciliation’ (»Probleme zur Versöhnung«), constantly generating one from the other. 
He investigates Riegl’s particular methodology of art interrogation - based on the 
study of pairs of antithetical concepts (Antithetik) - developed by Riegl in his 
Spätrömische Kunstindustrie. In Wind’s opinion, Riegl’s problems do not only have an 
interpretative function as means of systematic interpretation (Deutung).60 Rather, for 
Wind, Riegl sees his own conceptual pairs much more as historical factors, i.e. as 
‘determinations serving not so much to interpret the appearances as such, as to 
interpret their development’.61
 
54For Wind, only the setting of the ‘pre-artistic assignments’ (vorkünstlerische Aufgaben) is based on 
abstraction and reconstruction. Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’,  440-441. 
 In this sense, the development immanent in art 
represented in this way by Riegl is purer than that shown to us by Wölfflin, since the 
Riegelian version does not have a psychological but a logical origin, since it is the ‘logic 
in the succession of the ‘artistic problems’ themselves which gives to the development its 
own sense: every new ‘solution’ produces necessarily new ‘problems’, and, in this way, 
55‘von fertigen Gegebenheiten auf Probleme »zurückgeht«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440 
56‘zur Deutung der Erscheinungen, hinter diese zurückzugehen sucht und nicht von den Erscheinungen 
»abstrahiert«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 441. 
57Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 441. 
58Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 441. 
59Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’,  442 ff. 
60Which I think would have made them evidently much more similar to Wind’s own problems. 
61‘Bestimmungen, die nicht sowohl der Deutung der Erscheinungen als solcher, als vielmehr der Deutung 
ihrer Entwicklung’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 442. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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the individual form of the development is understood directly from the logic; while, for 
the psychological interpretation, the process gets something ‘plausible’ only once it can be 
covered by a general formula’.62
In fact, as Wind explicitly tells in his paper of 1925, several critiques were aimed 
at Riegl, some of them based on factual considerations, others pointed at the principles 
ruling Riegl’s logic of development, i.e. against the possibility of applying a logic to the 
development. According to Wind, the first critiques were based on the fact that it 
would be possible to locate phenomena which are not classifiable within the Riegelian 
logic. The others were built on the consideration that the principles ruling such a logic 
would denaturalize historical life (das geschichtliche Leben). In particular, Wind’s 
statements are aimed at refuting the value of these last critiques,
 
63 which according to 
him are formulated on the unjustified idea that the development can be understood as a 
real-psychological process (als realpsychologischen Prozeß).64 On the contrary, in fact, Wind 
is sure Riegl’s artistic problems are ideal: ‘So, since the ‘problems’ are by nature ideal 
constructions, their sequence cannot be understood as a real event. When we talk about 
the ‘logic’ of their sequence, we cannot mean the lawlikeness65 of a real course, but only 
the ideal consistency with which every solution of a problem gives rise to the creation of 
a new problem’.66
Although Riegl’s language - caught up in the psychological theories of his time - 
might conceal at some point this important distinction, according to Wind, Riegl 
almost always avoided the risk of allowing a confusion between the artistic problems 
and the really operative forces.
 
67 This can be demonstrated by considering the strong 
contrast set by Riegl between Kunstwollen and artistic problems, which are not classed 
with Kunstwollen, but rather set opposite it.68 This strong opposition is highlighted by 
Wind when he maintains that Riegl explicitly placed particular emphasis on the 
autonomous efficacy (autonome Wirksamkeit) of Kunstwollen. In fact, according to Wind, 
although Riegl saw the Kunstwollen as a real force (reale Kraft),69
 
62‘die Logik in der Abfolge der ‘künstlerischen Probleme’ selbst, welche der Entwicklung ihren Sinn gibt: Jede 
neue »Lösung« provoziert notwendig neue »Probleme«, und damit wird gerade aus der Logik heraus die 
individuelle Form des Ablaufs begriffen; während für die psychologische Deutung der Prozeß erst dann 
etwas »Einleuchtendes« erhält, wenn er sich durch eine generelle Formel decken läßt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 443. 
 he also stressed that it 
63In fact - as I shall further show here, Wind’s task is to prove the importance of considering the artistic 
problems as ideal, to prove the ideality of the artistic problems. Once the ideality of the artistic problems is 
illustrated, once the importance of a transcendental interrogation of art is justified, it is no more necessary 
to explain the insubstantiality of the factual critiques at Riegl, and this is, in my opinion, the reason why in 
his article Wind does not explicitly take care of these critiques aimed at Riegl. 
64I think Wind is here referring polemically to some interpretations of Riegl’s approach based on Dilthey’s 
Realpsychologie. 
65Translating Gesetzmäßigkeit by lawlikeness, I follow the Cambridge edition of the works of Kant. In 
particular, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. by Guyer and E. Matthews, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
66‘Denn da die »Probleme« ihrem Wesen nach Idealgebilde sind, so darf ihre Abfolge nicht einem 
wirklichen Geschehen gleichgeachtet werden. Wenn man von der »Logik« ihrer Abfolge spricht, so kann 
damit nicht die Gesetzmäßigkeit eines realen Verlaufs, sondern nur die ideale Folgerichtigkeit gemeint sein, 
mit der jede Lösung eines Problems die Bildung eines neuen Problems hervorruft’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 443. 
67Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443. 
68Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443. 
69‘In dem »Kunstwollen« erblickt er in der Tat eine reale Kraft; aber ausdrücklich betont er ihre autonome 
Wirksamkeit’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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cannot be determined by any external conditions, which means that it cannot be 
affected by the artistic problems.70 ‘The problems [...] do not affect the Kunstwollen, they 
only constitute ideal substructures built in order to be the points where to start from 
for the comprehension of the particular Kunstwollen. Riegl constructs the ‘problematic 
situation’ in order to measure the Kunstwollen against it, not in order to deduce the 
Kunstwollen from it’.71
At this point it begins to be clear - and also vital for the comprehension of 
Wind’s interpretation of Riegl’s thought - that what Wind is presenting in his paper of 
1925 is what he believes is the double-sided nature of Riegl’s reflection on art. 
According to Wind, it is evident that Riegl’s conception and investigation of the 
development of art in history presents two absolutely different and at the same time 
coexisting visions. The first is represented by the region of artistic problems and their 
solutions, the region of theoretical significance (Bedeutsamkeit). The second consists in 
the region of Kunstwollen, the region of psychological effectiveness (Wirksamkeit)
 
72 
which, as Wind reminds us, has to be regarded as undetermined73
For Wind, the region to which the problematic situation (Problemlage) belongs is 
evidently that of theoretical significance (Bedeutsamkeit), where the artistic appearances 
are conceived by Riegl as ideal contents, interpretable by means of a particular study of 
pairs of antithetical concepts - a doctrine of contrasts (Antithetik) - and where their 
succession is seen by him as an immanent-logic development.
 and, therefore, cannot 
be defined as a logic of development. 
74 On the other hand, 
when Riegl looks for the force which, in each individual case, causes (bewirkt) the 
solutions, Riegl is - according to Wind - interpreting the development of art as a 
dynamic-psychological process, which no longer relates to a Logos (»Logos«), but only 
to an ultimate aim (»Telos«).75 So, while in the first sphere the development - and I 
would add understanding of the development - is based on merely logical and 
coherent necessity, on the fact that every new solution provokes (»provozierte«) new 
problems, in the second sphere, the dynamic-psycological,76 Kunstwollen is no longer 
something which can be measured against the problems, but rather something with its 
own objectives (Zielsetzungen) and its own aspirations (Strebungen) so that what can be 
asked here is only to which direction the Kunstwollen is inclined (»tendiere«).77
 
70Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443. 
 The 
contemporaneous presence of these two different scopes within Riegl’s investigation of 
the history of art does not represent, for Wind, a contradiction, but only a double-
sidedness, a conflict which escaped the critics of Riegl and misled them. In fact, they 
71‘Die Probleme - so dürfen wir daraus schließen - wirken nicht auf das Kunstwollen ein, sie bilden nur 
ideale Substruktionen, die man errichtet, um von ihnen aus das jeweilige Kunstwollen zu erfassen. Riegl 
konstruiert die »Problemlage«, um das Kunstwollen an ihr zu messen, nicht um es aus ihr abzuleiten’, Edgar 
Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443. 
72Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443. 
73It cannot be determined by external conditions. See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’,  443-444. 
74Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 444. 
75Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 444. 
76Thus called by Wind in opposition to the first which is, rather, related to the objects in their ideality 
(ideal-gegenständliche Sphäre). Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 444. 
77Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 444. In particular, Wind refers as an example - in a footnote - to Riegl’s 
Das holländische Gruppenporträt (222), where according to him a particular Telos is implied by Riegl in 
Rembrandt’s development. See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, n. 1, 444. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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missed ‘the dualism of ‘ideal contents’ and ‘efficient forces’’,78
According to Wind, Panofsky managed to carry out the logical qualification 
(logische Weiterbildung) of Riegl’s thought, and gave the first sample of the systematic 
interrogation of art called by Wind himself ‘speculative reflexion’ (»spekulative 
Reflexion«). By stressing the importance of ideality in art investigation, and by moving 
Kunstwollen, in full consciousness, from the field of purely psychological effectiveness 
to the field of theoretical meaning - i.e. by considering Kunstwollen and artistic 
problems in the same ideal sphere
 and hurriedly attributed 
the idea of ‘logic’ - and I would add of logicality - to the efficient forces. So, for Wind, 
Riegl’s successors are those scholars who, consciously or not, neutralized this dualism 
by choosing one of the two aspects, and rereading and developing the Riegelian theory 
in either logical or psychological key. 
79 - Panofsky obtained the result that Kunstwollen was 
no longer the real force which produces the solution,80 but, rather, the ideal sense 
(Sinn) of the solution itself.81
The second possible approach, clearly opposed to the former perspective, is the 
psychological interpretation (psychologische Auffassung) of Riegl’s doctrine.
 
82 This 
position is described by him as based on an unconscious veiling of Riegelian dualism 
and starts from a psychologistic (psychologistisch) rereading of Riegl’s ‘artistic 
problems’. These no longer have, under this light, their character of ideal constructions 
(ideale Setzungen), but are, on the contrary, marked as efficient factors (wirkende 
Faktoren). In fact, for Wind, trying to establish the importance - the significant space 
(bedeutenden Raum) - of these artistic problems within artistic creation, and trying to 
investigate whether these artistic problems are objectively determinable can only make 
sense if these artistic problems are considered as psychological facts (psychologische 
Realitäten) requiring reconstruction (Rekonstruktion).83
I believe that on this point Wind is very clear.
 
84 He means that, while a logical-
theoretical interpretation of Kunstwollen and of artistic problems consists in 
approaching the artworks and the development in art by means of ideal instruments,85 
i.e. with a speculative reflection, a psychological interpretation of artistic problems and 
Kunstwollen consists in interrogating art by means of instruments which are not at our 
immediate disposal,86
 
78‘den Dualismus von »idealen Inhalten« und »wirkenden Kräften«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 444. 
 and must be reconstructed. So the method which leads to the 
determination of psychological factors involved in an artistic creation is the same 
method by which the pre-artistic facts are attainable: the abstractive reconstruction. In 
fact, since the psychological factors are still not available, this reconstruction must be 
based on an abstraction, exactly as in the case when the non-given real facts 
(Tatbestand), the non-given pre-artistic assignments (vorkünstlerische Aufgaben) - since the 
decisive documents are missing or somehow corrupted - require reconstructing. For 
79Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 445. As Wind says, ‘For the discovery of both of them - i.e. for the 
discovery of the Kunstwollen and of the artistic problems - the same conditions must be decisive’ (‘Für die 
Entdeckung beider mußten die gleichen Bedingungen maßgebend sein’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 
445. 
80‘die reale Kraft [...], welche die Lösung hervorbringt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’,  444-445. 
81‘der ideale »Sinn« der Lösung selbst’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 445. 
82Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 445. 
83Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 445. 
84See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 445. 
85Transcendentally valid, since they are immanent in our way of approaching art. 
86Since they are not immanent in our way of approaching art. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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this reason the scholars who see the problems as facts have a great appreciation of the 
abstractive method. This predisposition to abstraction is emblematically exemplified by 
Wind in quoting Hans Tietze, who says: ‘There is no systematic ready network of 
questions, [...] rather, there are only concrete problems, which are partly ready, i.e. 
consciously given (!), partly the abstraction (!) of a really existing connection’.87
In this way, Wind considers the ideality of the artistic problems definitely 
recognized and established. The other option would be to investigate art in a 
psychological and abstractive way, but this approach would only lead again to a 
methodology far distant from Wind’s proposal and implicitly focussed only on pre-
artistic assignments.
 
88 In my opinion, the psychological interpretation of Riegl’s 
doctrine would be only focussed on what precedes the artistic, losing the chance to 
discover what is immanent in the artistic, i.e. the categories and the principle that we 
put into play when we call an object89 an artistic object. In this last possibility Wind’s 
proposal consists : since it is the transcendental investigation of our way of 
approaching art, it does not require us to care about the temporal succession of the 
problems. Wind is now sure he can omit every specifically historical meaning 
(Bedeutung) acquired by the ‘problems’ within Riegl’s own doctrine: ‘It is possible to 
disregard the temporal succession of the problems, it is possible to omit to consider 
through which preceding solution the problem under discussion is ‘provoked’’.90 
According to Wind, it will always remain the fact - the systematic, basic fact 
(Grundfaktum) - that every artistic appearance in general (künstlerische Erscheinung 
überhaupt) is based on a ‘problem’, and that this problem rests on a ‘latent opposition’ 
(»latenten Gegensatz«).91
But, in my opinion, moving the plane of the discussion to a higher - 
transcendental - level does not free Wind from the obligation to reconsider in a 
systematic way the previously merely historical observation.
 
92 The historically 
perceptible succession of artistic phenomena, the historically perceptible fact that every 
new solution ‘provokes’ new problems, becomes - in the perspective of the systematic 
organization attempted by Wind - the ascertaining of the presence of ‘an enormous 
number of different problems, which can always be joined by new ones’,93
 
87‘Es gibt kein systematisch bereitetes Netz von Fragen, [...] sondern es gibt nur konkrete Probleme, die 
zum Teil gerichtet, d.h. bewußt vorhanden (!), zum Teil die Abstrahierung (!) eines tatsächlich 
bestehenden Zusammenhanges sind’, quotation in Wind, 445, with some small changes from Hans Tietze, 
Die Methode der Kunstgeschichte, Leipzig: von E. A. Seemann, 1913, 393. Wind is here explicitly referring to 
Panofsky’s critique to Tietze in Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, 321-339. See Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 439, 439 n. 1, and in particular 445, n. 2:’Hier ist die doppelte Methode aller 
Rekonstruktion deutlich ausgesprochen: Entweder Urkunde oder Abstraktion! Denn nur aus Urkunden 
kann man entnehmen, daß ein Problem »bewußt vorhanden« gewesen sei. - Zur Kritik solcher 
Urkundenbelege siehe: Panofsky, »Der Begriff des Kunstwollens«, wo darauf hingewiesen wird, daß alle 
theoretischen Äußerungen von Künstlern als »Objekte«, nicht als »Mittel der sinngeschichtlichen 
Interpretation« zu betrachten sind’. On Panofsky’s position, see supra. 
 and with 
88From which, as Wind has particularly stressed, the artistic problems need to be frequenter distinguished. 
89Transcendentally considered, i.e. paying attention to the condition for possibility of the artistic object in 
general. 
90‘Man kann von der zeitlichen Abfolge der Probleme abstrahieren, kann unbeachtet lassen, durch welche 
vorangegangene Lösung das jeweilige Problem »provoziert« werde’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 445-
446. 
91Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 446. 
92See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 446. 
93‘eine Unzahl verschiedener Probleme, zu denen sich immer neue gesellen können’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 446. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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which the kustwissenschaftlich art historian has somehow to deal. This consideration 
involves for Wind a new question: ‘but, then, do these problems have any root in a 
priori at all? Do principles exist which are basic to them all alike? - if because of its 
psychological realism we have attacked the sentence of Tietze just quoted - perhaps his 
first words are, however, legitimate: “There is no systematic ready network of 
questions, [...] rather, there are only concrete problems”’.94
 
 As I anticipated, Wind’s 
proposal is based on the location of the fundamental problem, the categorical antithesis 
fundamental to art interrogation: Fülle-Form. 
The systematic root of the artistic problems: the Fülle-Form antithesis and the 
Kunstwollen 
 
Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft, as a transcendental systematic study of art, claims to be 
merely a reflection on the possible way of approaching art, preserving the particularity 
of the artistic object in general, and without trying to reduce the particular nature of art 
to the mere product of different non-artistic factors.95 At the same time, it is now clear 
that Wind’s quest for the systematic root of the artistic problems is aimed at 
considering the problematical and antithetical pairs introduced by Riegl as ideal 
instruments, and not as a loose sum of concrete individual data.96
In this sense, the Fülle-Form opposition-relation is for Wind the key to the 
approach to art. He does not claim that Fülle and Form are the seminal elements 
actually producing a work of art, since this would rather be a psychological approach 
to art. Philosophical aesthetics may claim to get to the efficient causes of art and of the 
artistic objects. Wind does not claim to have found the philosopher’s stone for the 
determination of art: i.e. for the individuation of either the formal-conceptual or 
historical-empirical or psychological factors producing art. His Kunstwissenschaft is not 
a recipe for a universal and univocal interpretation of every artistic phenomenon. 
Rather, within Wind’s investigation of our way of approaching art,
 
97
Wind is not trying to classify artworks under general abstracted ideas, as 
Wölfflin did by proposing to choose the general concept which we may think better 
fitting for the formal description of the works of art of a period. Wölfflin’s concept of 
style was descriptive and merely morphological, i.e. based on an option between two 
contrasting general concepts deduced by means of an abstractive empirical-
psychological art investigation; Wind’s concept of style is absolutely different. Fülle 
and Form are not options, not concepts aimed at grouping artworks. Developing 
Panofsky’s early proposal for a transcendental investigation of our way of 
 the Fülle-Form 
antithetical pair is the transcendental category which we inevitably apply in every 
interrogation of art and artistic objects in general. 
 
94‘Haben diese Probleme aber dann überhaupt eine Wurzel im Apriori? Gibt es Prinzipien, die ihnen allen 
in gleicher Weise zugrunde liegen? - Wenn wir den oben zitierten Satz Tietzes wegen seines 
psychologischen Realismus angriffen, - vielleicht bestehen seine ersten Worte dennoch zu Recht: »Es gibt 
kein systematisch bereitetes Netz von Fragen, [...] es gibt nur konkrete Probleme [...]«?’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 446. 
95For Wind maintains that the instruments (the artistic problems) we have to use in art interrogation are 
immanent in the artistic, i.e. are transcendentally immanent in our way of approaching art. 
96See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 446. 
97Cf. what Panofsky says, using Wind’s doctoral dissertation’s model for a Kunstwissenschaft, in Erwin 
Panofsky, ‘Über das Verhältnis’, 129-161. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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interrogating art,98 Wind considers art a necessary composition between both the 
element of form and the element of content.99
For Wind, then, style is not to be defined by choosing between two opposite 
general concepts aimed at describing the mere form of a work of art. Rather, for him, 
the style of a work of art can be defined only by approaching the artistic object as if it 
were a specific, particular, coherent and necessarily unitary balance (Ausgleich) 
between two opposite albeit necessary elements, whose necessary opposition-
combination is not abstract, but transcendental, i.e. immanent in our way of looking at 
art and therefore immanent in art.
 His approach to art is thus not based on a 
choice but, rather, on the transcendental consideration that, when we look at an artistic 
object, we do not determine its style by an option between two general formal 
descriptions of the object itself, but rather by approaching the artwork as if it were a 
balance (Ausgleich) between the two opposite and (at the same time) necessary 
elements constituting the artistic object in general: Fülle and Form. 
100
It is evident at this point how Wind’s concepts of style, Kunstwollen and 
immanent Sinn are closely connected and - as I would dare to say - interchangeable. I 
would say that for Wind the style of an artistic appearance can be determined only if 
we consider the elements of the artistic problems in their purity, i.e. as two ideal - 
although absolutely opposite - elements, both necessary and coherently combined for 
the objectivity of the work of art. We can determine the style of an artistic object if we 
interrogate it as if it were a coherent balance (Ausgleich) between these opposite ideal 
elements.
 As I have shown, Wind does not approach the 
concreteness of the artistic object by abstracting a merely formal element from the 
concrete object. Rather, he considers the two elements, Fülle and Form, as both 
constituting the conditions of objectivity - this is the sense of Wind’s concept of 
concreteness - of the artistic object. And this concreteness is obviously not empirical, but 
considered by Wind only in its pureness, i.e. transcendentally. 
101 This means that, in order to see an object as a work of art, we have to 
assume it to be governed by a rule of coherence, we have to approach it by considering 
it, ideally, as if it were a coherent and unitary combination of formal and material 
elements. So, for art interrogation to be possible, we have to assume the presence of a 
principle of logical internal coherence, which we can call a general Kunstwollen or, more 
accurately, the Kunstwollen,102 the immanent Sinn immanent in the artistic object in 
general. And this principle of internal coherence is immanent in the artistic object in 
general only because it is immanent in our way of approaching art.103 Each time, we 
have to investigate this necessary coherence by means of the Fülle-Form categorical 
antithesis.104 But then, each time that we try to determine a style, we could also say - 
borrowing Wind’s own words - that we measure the general and immanent Kunstwollen 
against the fundamental artistic problem, in order to comprehend the particular 
Kunstwollen (das jeweilige Kunstwollen).105
 
98See Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, 321-339. 
 And this perfectly illustrates how Wind 
99See also Panofsky’s problematic illustration of the relation between form and content in art in Erwin 
Panofsky, ‘Das Problem des Stils’, 460-467. 
100As we, as finite beings, can know it. 
101See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 453, 464-465, 473, 477 ff. 
102Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443. 
103For a comparison between the Kantian transcendental unity of experience and what I would call the 
‘Windian transcendental unity of artistic experience’ see supra. 
104In a way that reminds us of the Kantian use of the cause-effect relation. 
105See supra and Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443: ‘The problems [...] do not affect the Kunstwollen, they Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
 
  17 
developed Panofsky’s complex and problematical statement that the interrogation of a 
work of art implicitly requires a coherent unitary principle, an immanent Sinn, which 
at the same time can only be determined by a category particular to art interrogation.106
The surprising synonymity which I have tried to show between the concepts of 
Kunstwollen, style and Sinn in Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft sheds more light on the 
systematic root of Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft. It sheds more light on Wind’s preference 
for a logical interpretation of Riegl’s concept of the Kunstwollen, and explains what 
Wind means by suggesting that we bring the Kunstwollen within the logic-ideal 
transcendental sphere, where the artistic problems are also supposed to be located. But 
it shows too the fundamental importance of the Fülle-Form antithesis, which now really 
reveals itself as the logical keystone of Wind’s transcendental approach to art, and, at 
the same time, as the key to Wind’s early art interrogation. Wind called it the 
Urantithese or the Urproblem.
 
107 The Fülle-Form antithesis lies behind108 what Wind calls 
the fundamental concept (Grundbegriff)109
 
 of the entire theory of art, behind the concept 
(Begriff) of the ‘concretely-intuitive’ (des »Konkret-Anschaulichen«). At this point, it is 
thus even more evident how urgent is, for Wind, a deduction and a systematization of 
the problems, the principles, which can offer guidance in art interrogation, in stylistic 
comparisons and in art documentary investigation. 
                                                                                                                                               
only constitute ideal substructures built in order to be the starting points for the comprehension of the 
particular Kunstwollen. Riegl constructs the ‘problematic situation’ in order to measure the Kunstwollen 
against it, not in order to deduce the Kunstwollen from it’ (‘Die Probleme - so dürfen wir daraus schließen - 
wirken nicht auf das Kunstwollen ein, sie bilden nur ideale Substruktionen, die man errichtet, um von 
ihnen aus das jeweilige Kunstwollen zu erfassen. Riegl konstruiert die »Problemlage«, um das 
Kunstwollen an ihr zu messen, nicht um es aus ihr abzuleiten’). 
106‘The single and individual (das Eine) [work of art] presupposes the use and the determination of the 
concept of Kunstwollen: [it demands] that any interpretation aimed at the inner significance of an artistic 
phenomenon must comprehend that phenomenon as a unity: [it demands] that (daß) formal and imitative 
elements (in contrast to Wölfflin’s doctrine of the ‘double root of style’) need not be reduced to separable 
and, on their part, irreducible concepts. They must be understood as different manifestations of a common 
fundamental tendency, the comprehension of which, in this particular sense (als solche), is precisely the 
task of the real ‘fundamentals of art history’’, in Erwin Panofsky, ‘The Concept of Artistic Volition’, Critical 
Inquiry, 8: 1, 1981, 26, translation modified. The German text: ‘Denn das Eine setzt ja der Gebrauch wie die 
Bestimmung des Begriffes Kunstwollen voraus: daß jedes künstlerische Phänomen für eine auf seine 
innere Bedeutsamkeit abzielende Interpretation als eine Einheit erfaßbar sei: daß ,,formale“ und 
,,imitative“ Elemente - entgegen der Wölfflinschen Lehre von einer ,,doppelten Wurzel des Stils“ - nicht 
auf gesonderte und ihrerseits irreduzible Begriffe gebracht zu werden brauchen, sondern als die 
verschiedenen Äußerungen einer gemeinsamen Grundtendenz begriffen werden können, einer Tendenz, 
die als solche zu erfassen eben die Aufgabe wirklicher ,,Grundbegriffe der Kunstgeschichte“ ist’, in Erwin 
Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, 321-339 (here in Erwin Panofsky, Aufsätze zu Grundfragen der 
Kunstwissenschaft, Berlin: Volker Spiess, 1980, 35). 
107Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461, 462, 469, 473. 
108See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 448: ‘Der wahre Ursprung der Unterscheidung zwischen Optischem 
und Haptischem tritt zutage, wenn man auf den Grundbegriff aller Kunsttheorie reflektiert, welcher die 
Region des Künstlerischen dem Denken allererst eröffnet: den Begriff des »Konkret-Anschaulichen«. Was 
das »Konkret-Anschauliche« vom »Rein-Anschaulichen« unterscheidet, ist die sinnliche Fülle. Bedingung 
alles Anschaulichen aber ist die Gestalt, die Form. »Fülle« und »Form« müssen sich also verbinden, um 
die Region des Künstlerischen überhaupt zu konstituieren’. 
109The Windian evocation - although implicit and in a different interpretative context - of this Wölfflinian 
term loads the Windian Kunstwissenschaft with a particular meaning: Wind’s transcendental systematic 
study of art can be seen as the development and definitive fulfillment of Panofsky’s discussion of 
Wölfflin’s Grundbegriffe. For Panofsky’s position see Erwin Panofsky, ‘Das Problem des Stils’, 460-467 and 
Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens, 321-339. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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The a priori deduction 
 
The investigation of the artistic proposed by Wind rests on the localization or, 
more accurately, on the conceptual setting of latent problems in the work of art. The 
fullness-form antithesis is, as we have seen above, the Urproblem, the interpretative 
category on which the possibility of finding an horizon of sense (Sinn) in art is 
founded. The question arising in Wind’s mind, at this point, is evidently this: how can 
this Kunstwissenschaft regulate the art historian’s job? To put it in other words, Wind is 
impelled to show how the transcendental foundation of a systematic study of art can 
really be followed by the deduction of a system, a table, of problems or principles 
coherently connected, which can be considered as the golden compass for the 
documentary study of art. Even more fundamentally, the question is: how can a 
stylistic objective comparison take place? 
The first attempt in this sense is made by Wind in testing the value of the pairs 
of antithetical concepts which Panofsky suggested be borrowed from Riegl and used as 
categorical tools for art interrogation: haptical-optical haptisch-optisch and subjectivistic-
objectivistic subjektivistisch-objektivistisch. As we have seen above, for Wind, the 
opposite elements constituting these antithetical pairs can be neither empirical nor 
psychological.110 So, as Wind explicitly maintains, his first attempt to define the system 
of regulative principles for art interrogation is an a priori deduction.111
The true origin of the optisch-haptisch opposition is sought by Wind in a 
transcendental context. He locates this opposition by reflecting on the fundamental 
concept of the whole theory of art, ‘which really reveals the region of the artistic to 
thought: the concept of the ‘concretely-intuitive’’.
 
112 This last concept, as we have seen 
above, is brought back by Wind to the fundamental opposition for the investigation of 
art in general: fullness-form (Fülle-Form), which, ‘in order to be specifically marked for 
the figurative arts, needs two intuitive orders - both related, and, at the same time, 
opposed, to each other - expressing the sensuous-elementary condition of this art’.113
Optical and haptical are no longer the terms of an option but, rather, the 
absolutely different but, at the same time, necessary orders of the visual intuition 
mirroring, in the specialized investigation of the visual art, the role played by form and 
fullness in the investigation of the artistic field in general: they are two opposite and at 
the same time necessary elements for the forming of the visual artistic object, i.e. the 
sensuous-elementary conditions of art in the field of the visual. It could be said, then, 
that we can confront an object and see it as a work of visual art, only by asking 
 
Thus the antithetical conceptual pair optical-haptical (optisch-haptisch) is not a really 
fundamental category, but only the first level of specification of the fullness-form 
antithesis for the investigation of the visual art. 
 
110In particular, they cannot even refer to two different psychological orders. For instance, in the case of 
Hagia Sophia, the church built by Justinian, Wind notes that the opposition between the longitudinal 
element and the transversal must have a purely ideal value, since this opposition needs to be absolute. 
Otherwise, we would only have a kind of intersection between the two elements, not a truly categorical 
opposition, which is the research object of Wind. 
111Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458-461, in particular 461. 
112‘welcher die Region des Künstlerischen dem Denken allererst eröffnet: den Begriff des »Konkret-
Anschaulichen«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 448. 
113‘um es speziell für die bildende Kunst zu kennzeichnen, bedarf es zweier anschaulicher Ordnungen, die, 
aufeinander bezogen und zugleich einander entgegengesetzt, die sinnlich-elementaren Voraussetzungen 
dieser Kunst zum Ausdruck bringen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 449. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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ourselves how it resolves the problematic antithesis between the haptical and the 
optical elements, which are consequently ideal tools of investigation, i.e. a specialized 
version, for the visual field, of the Fülle-Form antithesis. 
In the visual appearance (Erscheinung) - as with the categorical antithesis 
between form and fullness - we find neither an absolute tactile value nor an absolute 
optical value.114 There is not the purely haptical, i.e. the purely formal element, 
deprived of every optical determination, totally abstract as a geometric figure - 
something intuitive but nothing concrete. Nor is there the purely optical, the purely 
concrete element, deprived of every haptical element and hence of every formal limit, 
totally amorphous as pure light - something concrete, but not intuitive.115 In the 
appearance, in fact, both of these values must lean on each other in order to 
constitutively earn meaning, since ‘only their connection concretely constitutes an 
intuitive shape’,116 ‘only the mutual relationship between both of them lends each one 
of them the character of an intuitive order’.117
A methodological indication, an exemplification of the path to follow in order to 
interrogate a work of art,
 
118 is expressly furnished by Wind at the end of page 449 of 
Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, where he writes: ‘It is the task of thinking to 
establish tension and to consider it as the ideal condition of all forming. However, the 
forming itself reveals itself in the conflict between the two poles. The ‘meaning’ of the 
different morphological characters can be sought in the fact that they represent - each 
one in its own manner - a balance between the optical and the haptical orders’.119 This 
means, then, that we can get the Sinn - or, if we prefer, the style,120 the Kunstwollen - of 
a work of visual art by interrogating it as if it were a determined solution to the 
problematic opposition121 between the two ideally opposite orders: optical (optisch) and 
haptical (haptisch). By approaching a work of art in this way, we would set its 
individuality in an horizon of meaning.122
 
114Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 449. 
 
115Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 449. 
116‘erst ihre Verbindung macht eine konkret-anschauliche Gestalt aus’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 449. 
117‘Erst die Beziehung beider zueinander gibt jedem von ihnen das Gepräge einer anschaulichen Ordnung’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 449. 
118That is, in order to reach an interpretation (Deutung) of the work of art, abandoning the merely 
morphological approach and thereby placing the artwork within a horizon of meaning. 
119‘Aufgabe des Denkens ist es, die Spannung festzulegen, sie als ideelle Voraussetzung aller Gestaltung 
ins Auge zu fassen. Die Gestaltung selbst aber bekundet sich in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen den 
beiden Polen. Man kann den »Sinn« der verschiedenen morphologischen Charaktere darin suchen, daß sie 
- jeder in seiner Weise - einen Ausgleich zwischen der optischen und der haptischen Ordnung darstellen’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 449-450. 
120As I have shown above, in Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft, Sinn and style, and also Kunstwollen, are synonyms: 
he understands style as a transcendental unitary principle of coherence, i.e. as the Sinn, that we 
transcendentally presuppose each time that we consider something as artistic. Style is no longer a 
characteristic of a work of art or of a period, but a transcendental horizon of meaning (Sinn) immanent in 
our way of approaching any object of the Kunstwissenschaft. 
121I.e., as he also says, ‘a determined balance (Ausgleich) of them’. 
122To be perhaps pedantically precise: within the horizon defined by the relation-tension between haptisch ed 
optisch values, which would be obviously missing in a merely morphological approach. See, for instance, 
the following Windian example: ‘What the morphological single-description calls ‘dissolved contour’ now 
receives its own particular meaning (Sinn). Leonardo’s ‘sfumato’ is interpreted as a certain form of the 
‘balance’’ (‘Was bei der morphologischen Einzelbeschreibung etwa »aufgelöster Kontur« heißt, erhält nun 
seinen besonderen Sinn. Leonardos »sfumato« wird als eine bestimmte Form des »Ausgleichs« gedeutet’), 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 450. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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At this point, however, since the Riegelian optical-haptical antithesis is reduced 
by Wind to what clearly appears as the first step of an investigation of visual art, and, 
since this opposition is evidently based on the general antithesis between fullness and 
form, it is evident that this visual antithesis cannot be suitable as the categorical 
antithesis sought by Wind - following Panofsky - for the transcendental foundation of 
art interrogation and for investigation of the necessarily inherent Sinn. Rather, all these 
considerations only enforce and make more evident what we already know: that Wind 
has to choose the fullness-form opposition as the transcendental categorical antithesis. 
Evidently, the point is that the discussion led Wind back to his starting point: to the 
Urproblem. An a priori deduction, in fact, only shows that this problem, the optisch-
haptisch opposition, can be traced back to the fullness-form categorical opposition. In this 
sense, for the specific purpose of Wind’s inquiry, an a priori deductive method seems 
to be ineffectual. 
However, Wind was determined, and, although the first attempt proceeded in 
the wrong direction, another was made with the other conceptual pair proposed by 
Panofsky, i.e. the other important Riegelian antithesis: subjectivistic-objectivistic 
(subjektivistisch-objektivistisch).123 According to Wind, this last pair, introduced by Riegl 
in the field of artistic research, seem to be, prima facie, particularly suitable for the 
formulation of the categorical antithesis, since it spreads to all the possible single 
regions, remaining, at the same time, applicable to each of them.124 In Riegl’s theory, for 
instance, as Wind accurately summarises it, the haptical and the optical values also 
refer to this other conceptual pair: the haptical values, as formal values, constitute the 
‘primary qualities’ and can therefore be called objectivistic; the optical values, on the 
other hand, are the ‘secondary qualities’ and can be called subjectivistic. The reason for 
this correspondence between haptical-optical values and objectivistic-subjectivistic 
values evidently derives from Riegl’s conception of the objective as being what marks 
the object as outside the mind, and of the subjective as what marks the mind’s 
projection upon the object outside it. Impressionism, in this sense, is, for Riegl, an 
example of optical art, allowing forms to merge, taking into account the viewer’s 
conditions of perception and the inward emotional life of what is depicted. Egyptian 
art, by contrast, is an example of haptical art, tactile, representing things as self-
contained. Wind explains: ‘As well, the intuitive depth-values are only phenomena of a 
subjective consciousness, while the surface-relations can be mathematically 
determined’.125
Nevertheless, Wind does not hide his perplexities on the subject-object 
relationship as formulated by Riegl, which he judges ‘epistemologically dubious’.
 
126 
According to Wind, in fact, ‘one can say of the psychophysical subject only that - as 
bearer of particular qualities - it spatially ‘faces’ the objects’.127
 
123Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458-461. 
 In this Riegelian sense, 
the subject turns out to be a fact (Faktum) inside the real world, and, expressed in this 
material (dinglichen) way, the subject-object opposition therefore constitutes only an 
124Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458-459. 
125‘Ebenso sind die anschaulichen Tiefenwerte nur Phänomene eines subjektiven Bewußtseins, während 
die Ebenenrelationen sich mathematisch festlegen lassen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 459. 
126‘erkenntnistheoretisch bedenklich’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 459. 
127‘Nur von dem psychophysischen Subjekt kann man sagen, daß es - als Träger besonderer Eigenschaften - 
den Objekten räumlich »gegenüberstehe«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 459. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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empirical premise and not an a priori one.128
Once again, in conformity with the choice of an a priori deductive method, 
Wind believes that a solution can be found to these difficulties by setting the discussion 
on a transcendental level. In fact, bringing the question of the subject-object relation 
onto this other level means that what was before merely a distinction between the 
determinations (Bestimmungen) localized in the subject and those in the object, merely an 
opposition between the observing subject and the object observed, is now not entirely 
lost, but only transformed.
 
129 Speaking in a Kantian manner (Kantisch zu reden), the 
subject-object relationship can be transformed from a psychophysical into a 
transcendental relation by understanding it as a distinction within the way of looking 
at things.130 Thus, we will face the fact that ‘the ‘objectivistic’ and the ‘subjectivistic’ 
qualities lead back to two different functions of the consciousness’.131 ‘One of these 
functions may be called ‘sensation’ and the other one ‘intuition’; in any case the first 
one corresponds to the ‘sensuous fullness’ of the object, and the other one to its ‘formal 
determination’’.132
In this sense, the procedure carried out by Wind looks much more like a kind of 
transcendental deduction of the category - the categorical antithesis - for art 
interrogation than a deduction of a system capable of regulating art interrogation. 
Seeking an antithesis to which all the artistic problems can be traced back, one which is 
not empirical but a priori, Wind excludes the subject-object relationship because of its 
psychophysical aspects, and prefers to trace this last relationship too back to the 
fullness-form antithesis, which is then definitely indicated by him as the categorical 
original antithesis (Urantithese). As he says: ‘for this [antithesis] the necessary connection 
with the artistic can easily be proved’,
 
133 since, ‘as soon as one understands it as a 
polarity, i.e. as soon as one sets fullness and form reciprocally one against the other, 
one gets the problem of the concretely-intuitive representation, and with it the region 
of the artistic reveals itself’.134
Certainly, as Wind himself admits, the fullness-form antithesis belongs to other 
fields of the spirit (Geistesgebiete) too, but only for the systematic science of art does it 
represent a fundamental categorial interrelation.
 
135 The knowledge of nature, for 
instance, does not consider ‘both concepts as equivalent opponents’,136 but rather ‘it has 
as its goal dissolving fullness into form’.137
 
128Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 459. 
 Fullness and form are classified as separate 
spheres and ‘the problem is not in their reciprocal penetration, but rather, on the 
129Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 459-460. 
130Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
131‘die »Objektivistischen« und die »subjektivistischen« Eigenschaften letzten Endes auf zwei verschiedene 
Funktionen des Bewußtseins zurückführen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
132‘von diesen mag man nun die eine als »Empfindung«, die andere als »Anschauung« bezeichnen; 
jedenfalls entspricht der ersteren die »sinnliche Fülle«, der letzteren die »formale Bestimmtheit« des 
Gegenstandes’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
133‘für diese läßt sich der notwendige Zusammenhang mit dem Künstlerischen leicht nachweisen’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
134‘sobald man sie als Polarität faßt, d. h. sobald man Fülle und Form wechselseitig aufeinander bezieht, 
erhält man das Problem der konkret-anschaulichen Gestaltung, und damit eröffnet sich die Region des 
Künstlerischen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
135Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
136‘beide Begriffe als Gleichwertige Gegenspieler’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
137‘hat sie das Ziel, die Fülle in Form aufzulösen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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contrary, in their detachment from each other, in the liberation of form from fullness’.138 
However, even if the union of fullness and form is not the goal of the knowledge of 
nature, it constitutes the point of departure of the research, and, in this sense, it seems 
to Wind that, at least in its point of departure, the science of nature touches the reign of 
the artistic (das Reich des Künstlerischen).139 The common element lies, ‘however, 
precisely in what is pre-scientific relative to the whole science of the nature, [in what is] 
pre-artistic to every work of art: [it lies] in that bare ‘aggregate’ which remains behind, 
if, by virtue of an intellectual abstraction, one excludes all synthetic interpretation from 
the sensuous’.140 This sensuous aggregate does not have any form of legality 
(Gesetzlichkeit) - neither a concretely-intuitive one nor a legality belonging to the field of 
the science of nature: ‘it is rather the quintessential lawless, ‘meaning-free’, which lies 
prior to every way of posing problems’.141
However, for Wind, this aggregate is able to get a meaning, since it can be 
pervaded by the law of nature; this happens only when the thought of the science of 
nature places that aggregate under its own categories in order to dissolve the fullness 
into the form.
 
142 Equally, a work of art too remains a simple aggregate deprived of 
meaning, ‘as long as one does not look at the connection of fullness and form as a 
problem’,143 while ‘only by means of the position of this problem’,144 i.e. by 
understanding the connection of fullness and form as a problem, ‘one subsumes 
(unterstellt) the object under the fundamental category of the thought of the systematic 
science of art’145 and inserts it, therefore, within a horizon of meaning.146
The path followed by Wind, however, i.e. the attempt, carried out on the basis 
of an a priori deduction, to show the principles of art interrogation, led him back to a 
further consolidation of the importance and the validity of the fullness-form antithesis 
as a category for approaching art. Wind definitely shows that, through this categorical 
antithesis, and therefore under a kunstwissenschaftlich consideration, the artwork is in 
fact no longer seen as a mere aggregate. At the same time, as has previously been 
shown, the artwork is no longer at risk of being determined under other categories (as, 
for instance, the causal nexus) not pertaining to art. This was the result of Wind’s a 
priori deduction. However, the question at stake, as we have seen, was different. As 
Wind explicitly states, it is clear that the categorical original fullness-form antithesis 
(Urantithese) cannot yet have a concrete application (konkrete Anwendung) and the a 
priori deduction is not enough: ‘one cannot immediately ‘interrogate’ a picture about 
 
 
138‘das Problem liegt, statt in ihrer wechselseitigen Durchdringung, gerade umgekehrt in ihrer Loslösung 
voneinander, in der Befreiung der Form von der Fülle’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
139Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460. 
140‘jedoch gerade in dem, was an aller Naturwissenschaft vorwissenschaftlich, an allen Kunstwerken 
vorkünstlerisch ist: in jenem bloßen »Aggregat«, das zurückbleibt, wenn man kraft einer gedanklichen 
Abstraktion alle synthetische Deutung aus den Sinnlichen ausschließt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460-
461. 
141‘ist vielmehr das schlechthin Gesetzlose, »Sinnfreie«, das vor aller Problemstellung liegt’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 461. 
142Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461. 
143‘solange man die Verbindung von Fülle und Form nicht als Problem ansieht’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 461. 
144‘Erst mit der Setzung dieses Problems’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461. 
145‘unterstellt man das Objekt der grundlegenden Kategorie des kunstwissenschaftlichen Denken’, Edgar 
Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461. 
146Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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the attitude it has to the polarity of ‘fullness’ and ‘form’’.147 At this point, Wind is 
aware that, in order to find the principles for an objective art interrogation, the path 
must be different. As he maintains, ‘in order to find a response in the intuitive, one 
must descend into the region of the intuitive’.148
The need for a medium: the scheme 
 So, the application of the 
transcendental category to the concretely-intuitive requires a medium: the scheme. 
The principle of coherent unity is absolutely essential for a comprehension of 
the meaning of Wind’s schematism.149
Seeking unity and interrogating art and the artistic object in general as if they 
were ideally ruled by an organizing principle, as if they were a balance between both 
Fülle and Form, entails that we also have to interrogate the conditions of objectivity of 
each particular kind of art by specializing this investigative principle of articulation. By 
using the term style, or Kunstwollen, in the Windian sense,
 This internal coherence, which makes our art 
interrogation possible, must be also traced at a much more particularized level: not 
only as the condition of the possibility of our approach to art in general, but also as the 
condition of objectivity for an artistic appearance in a particular sphere - for instance, in 
the visual. So, the necessary rule of coherence, according to which we approach art, 
needs to be investigated in visual art by seeing how, in particular, the elements of the 
visual can be seen as ideally articulated. 
150 I would say that, when we 
interrogate an object as an artistic performance, we presume it to be ruled by a stylistic 
organization.151
In the third paragraph of Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, entitled 
Fundamental features of a systematic deduction,
 So, I believe it can be said that, for Wind, every time we interrogate a 
given artwork, for instance, a visual one, we measure its stylistic organization at two 
different levels: in general, as an artistic performance, by means of the a priori deduced 
antithetical pair Fülle-Form; and in particular, for instance, as a visual artwork, by 
considering how the a priori categorical opposition can be translated within the field of 
objectivity - and, in Wind’s particular case, within the field of visual objectivity - by 
means of a scheme of particular opposite pairs. 
152
 
147‘man kann ein Bild nicht unmittelbar daraufhin »abhören«, wie es sich zu der Polarität von »Fülle« und 
»Form« stelle’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461. 
 Wind is again reflecting on the essence 
of the ‘artistic problem’. He reminds us that the problem is constituted by the antithesis 
148‘um im Anschaulichen einen Widerhall zu finden, muß man selbst in die Region des Anschaulichen 
herabsteigen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461. 
149As I have shown, the Fülle-Form categorical antithesis is for Wind the starting point, the inescapable 
transcendental category which we apply to an object the moment we want to see it as an artistic 
performance. The artistic object in general is ideally a balance, an articulation, between Fülle and Form, 
because a coherent unitary principle is presupposed by our way of approaching art. Seeking a balance 
between Fülle-Form in approaching an artistic appearance adds up to saying that we seek internal 
coherence, a coherent unity. 
150I.e. in the sense of the logical principle of necessary unitary and immanent coherence. 
151As I have shown, this stylistic organization, this style necessarily ruling the artwork in general, is a 
necessary principle of transcendental logic and not the result of an abstract description of a work of art. 
The style is neither a formal abstraction nor an empirical-psychological or historical factor. Style is for 
Wind the general condition of the work of art in general: the logical principle of internal coherence immanent 
in our way of approaching art and therefore immanent in art. Style is the condition of possibility of art 
investigation and, at the same time, the object of art interrogation, since, each time, we have to measure this 
transcendentally immanent unitarian coherence by means of the fundamental artistic problem - the Fülle-
Form categorical antithesis - and, as we shall see, by means of the scheme of particular artistic problems. 
152Grundzüge einer systematischen Ableitung, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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between two intuitive orders, but he also states the fundamental need for the two 
orders to meet up on the same level, on the same layer, so that opposition can take 
place.153 This means that, ‘therefore, besides the antithetical form, every problem has 
still its particular place. Through this place, i.e. through the position on which the 
antithetical conflict happens, it is different from the remaining problems’.154
These last considerations beautifully introduce the sense in which Wind 
elaborated his own scheme which we will analyse in depth in the following pages. 
Wind states that it is necessary to locate a middle element (Medium) in order to turn the 
antithesis into the concrete (ins Konkrete) and to make it suitable for handling the object. 
Close to the categorical antithesis, therefore, it is necessary to find ‘a regional scheme 
showing us, in the concretely intuitive, the positions on which the category is to prove 
itself’.
 So, to 
summarise, one could say that while the ‘problems’ share the same distinguishing 
categorical form of the tension (Form der Spannung), they also differ from each other 
through this place (Ort), specific to each one of them. 
155 These places, these positions, cannot be something specifically artistic, since, as 
simple regions of the artistic, they only furnish the ground (Boden) for it; nevertheless, 
for the existence (Bestand) of the work of art, they must (müssen) be as necessary as the 
categorical antithesis, since ‘they contain the conditions on which it [the categorical 
antithesis] must be particularized in order to be applicable to the appearances’.156
 
 
The regions of the visual: places for an objective confrontation of styles 
 
According to Wind, once the ‘the categorical condition for the interpretation of the 
phenomenon as an artistic performance’157 has been detected within the categorical 
antithetical conflict (Antithetik), it is necessary to deal with the ‘artistic appearance 
conditions’,158 i.e. with the ‘conditions according to which artistic performances in 
general become objective’.159 These conditions for the objectivity of the artistic, however, 
cannot be anything but the ‘general conditions of objectivity in general’,160 and this 
takes Wind’s research back to the analysis of the phenomenology of the sensory fields 
(die Phänomenologie der Sinnesgebiete)161 in which ‘works of art appear’.162 Now, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the different arts depending on the sensory spheres 
to which they belong.163
 
153Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458. 
 So, although in some footnotes Wind shows a particular care 
154‘Außer der antithetischen Form hat also jedes Problem noch seinen besonderen Ort. Durch diesen Ort, d. 
h. durch die Stelle, an der die Antithetik sich abspielt, ist es von den Übrigen Problemen unterschieden’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458. 
155‘ein regionales Schema, welches uns im Konkret-Anschaulichen die Stellen zeigt, an denen die Kategorie 
sich bewähren soll’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461-462. 
156‘sie enthalten die Bedingungen, unter denen diese spezifiziert werden muß, um überhaupt auf 
Erscheinungen anwendbar zu sein’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
157‘kategoriale Voraussetzung für die Deutung eines Phänomens als künstlerische Leistung’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
158‘Bedingungen der künstlerischen Erscheinung’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
159‘Voraussetzungen, unter denen künstlerische Leistungen überhaupt gegenständlich werden’, Edgar 
Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
160‘allgemeinen Bedingungen der Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
161Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
162‘Kunstwerke in Erscheinung treten’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
163Whereas for the search for the categorial antithesis this has not been necessary. See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 462. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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for the interdisciplinarity, by trying to apply his own method to other fields also - 
above all music - his attention remains focussed on the visual sphere (visuelle Sphäre), 
which, as we have seen above, is divided by Wind into three further spheres, each one 
consisting of three regions. 
It can hardly escape the reader how the mode of proceeding proposed by Wind 
is similar, if not identical, to the strategy adopted by Panofsky, in 1925, in his essay 
Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie.164 Panofsky himself admits to 
owing Wind much, and I have already had the opportunity to stress and illustrate 
some crucial points of contact between the two authors. We have seen how Wind 
develops the proposal of a transcendental and systematic art investigation 
(Kunswissenschaft), by giving an answer to the questions left open by Panofsky in his 
essay of 1920.165
As has been said of Panofsky’s paper of 1925 on the relationship between history 
and theory of art,  
 
 
the most general, inclusive antithesis in art is, according to Panofsky, that 
between ‘fullness’ and ‘form’. This line of thinking leads Panofsky to formulate 
the system of three layers of opposed values present in every work of visual art: 
1. elementary values (optical-tactile, i.e. space as opposed to bodies); 2. 
figurative values (depth-surface); 3. compositional values (internal links-
external links, i.e. internal organical unity as opposed to external juxtaposition). 
In order for a work of art to be created, a balance must be struck within each of 
these scales of value. The absolute poles, the limiting values themselves, are 
outside of art: purely optical values characterize only amorphous luminous 
phenomena. Purely tactile values characterize only pure geometrical shapes 
deprived of any sensual fullness. A solution which determines the position of 
the work of art at some point on any given scale at the same time determines its 
position on the other scales. To decide for surface (as opposed to depth) means 
to decide for rest (as opposed to movement), for isolation (as opposed to 
connection) and for tactile values (as opposed to optical ones): a typical 
example confirming the analysis quoted above may be the Egyptian relief. The 
individual work of art is not, as claimed by Wölfflin, defined by one antithetical 
category or the other, but is situated at some point on the scale between the 
limiting values.166
 
 
This synthetic general description of the Panofskian approach in 1925 to the artistic 
field perfectly suits what Wind wrote in his doctoral dissertation in 1922 where, in fact, 
he was still far from reaching a complete definition of his own scheme.167 For Panofsky 
in Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie, as for Wind in his doctoral 
dissertation,168
 
164See Erwin Panofsky, ‘Über das Verhältnis’, 129-161. 
 the scheme still only consisted of a single sphere of the visual, divided 
into three layers of opposed values according to which a visual artwork is to be 
165Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, 321-339. 
166Jan Bialostocki, ‘Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968): Thinker, Historian, Human Being’, Simiolus: Netherlands 
Quarterly for the History of Art, 4: 2, 1970, 73. 
167Edgar Wind, Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand, 203. 
168Edgar Wind, Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand, 175-205. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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interrogated.169 I believe there is probably a very good reason why Panofsky sticks to 
the first sphere of the three which I am going to illustrate: Wind will only develop the 
rest of his scheme - adding the part relating to the other two spheres of the visual - in 
1925, in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, in the same volume as Panofsky’s 
paper, while Panofsky, at that time, could only use for his article the conclusions of 
Wind’s doctoral dissertation of 1922.170
The complete scheme, developed by Wind in 1925, is based on the localization 
of three necessary spheres for the transposition of the fullness-form categorical antithesis 
into the phenomenological (phänomenologisch)
 
171 conditions of the visual, for the 
conversion of the Fülle-Form antithesis - the Urantithese - into the concrete (ins 
Konkrete),172 into a multitude of concrete problems (in eine Vielheit konkreter Probleme).173 
Wind’s own words: ‘as the categorical antithetical conflict contains the conditions for 
the interpretation of a phenomenon as artistic performance, so we now come across the 
conditions under which the artistic performances in general (überhaupt) become real 
(gegenständlich)’.174 At the same time, as I have partially anticipated above, by 
transposing the categorical antithesis under the phenomenological conditions under 
which the artistic performance appears,175
 
169However, in 1922 Wind had already carried out the deduction and a partial systematization of the 
principles for a reliable art interrogation (Edgar Wind, Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand, 
198-203) - almost with the same words as it is carried out by Wind in 1925 (Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 
458-461). Again, this probably explains why that dissertation was so important to Panofsky. 
 Wind wants to show how the principle of the 
necessary and harmonious balance between two opposite values also rules our whole 
investigation of the artistic field. For Wind, we approach the work of art as if it were an 
articulation between two opposite elements. Precisely this articulation must be sought 
in order that artistic language may be understood within its particularity, i.e. by ideally 
seeing the artwork as the result of a balanced encounter of a formal and a material 
element in the artist’s activity, and not as a merely physical object. So, too, when we 
investigate the most particular aspects of the work of art, i.e. its conditions of 
objectivity, we are transcendentally forced to read them as balances (Ausgleiche) 
between opposite elements. I believe this means that, for Wind, once more, when we 
interrogate art we always look for stylistic unity, or, rather, we can interrogate a work 
of art only according to a principle of stylistic unity, i.e. only as if all its aspects were 
each time the result of a particular articulation among formal and material elements. 
And this means that, in Wind’s theory, the stylistic unity which must be assumed to be 
ruling the work of art in general does not have a descriptive origin or even a voluntaristic 
one. Rather, it is precisely the ideal immanent sense, the Kunstwollen which we 
measure each time through artistic problems, when we interrogate the artwork as if it 
were a determined solution (Lösung) or a determined balance (Ausgleich) of the 
170In contrast, it should be said that in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme Wind had the chance to 
comment upon Panofsky’s article Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie, despite the fact 
that both the articles were published in the same volume in 1925. On this see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 448 n. 2 and, in particular, 461 n. 1. 
171Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471. 
172Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461. 
173Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471. 
174‘Enthielt die kategoriale Antithetik die Voraussetzung für die Deutung eines Phänomens als 
künstlerischer Leistung, so stoßen wir nunmehr auf die Voraussetzungen, unter denen künstlerische 
Leistungen überhaupt gegenständlich werden’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
175‘die phänomenologischen Bedingungen, unter denen diese Leistung in Erscheinung tritt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 471. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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problematic opposition - set on purpose by the thought, by the kunstwissenschaftlich 
thinking - between the two ideally opposite orders. In this way, we seek the particular 
principle of internal coherence of the artwork, its particular style, its Kunstwollen. 
As Wind himself says:  
 
The art historian analyzes, for instance, the form of space which is inherent in a 
certain picture by asking: How does this form of space reconcile the antagonism 
between the dimensions of plane and depth - For there exists a natural conflict 
between the visual qualities of these two dimensions, a conflict and at the same 
time a necessary relation. I cannot emphasize the qualities of depth without 
reducing the importance of the plane, and vice versa. But on the other hand, I 
must relate the qualities of depth to those of plane, in order to make them 
visible; and I must relate the qualities of plane to those of depth, in order to 
distinguish them. This is what I call an artistic problem in which the artist has 
to make a decision. It is not the only one. I may ask as well: What is the 
difference between painting a line and painting a spot? And I can answer: The 
line presents a certain value of form and limitation, while the spot presents a 
certain value of tone. Now I cannot draw a line without giving it a certain tone; 
for otherwise it would not be visible; it would be merely a geometrical concept. 
On the other hand I cannot make a spot without giving it a certain form. 
Otherwise it would be nothing. But by using the tone only for making a line 
visible, I disqualify its intrinsic values, I use it merely as a means. And by using 
the form in order to shape a spot, I also reduce its independent value. This is 
the conflict between intensive and extensive qualities. A third example of an 
artistic problem is the relation of the work as a whole to its individual elements, 
its details. I cannot speak of these individual elements without regarding their 
connection to the whole; and there is no sense in speaking of a whole without 
assuming the presence of individual elements. But the more an artist 
emphasizes the importance of the details, the more the value of the whole is 
reduced to a mere form of connection. The whole turns out to be a composition. 
On the other hand, the more he emphasizes the importance of the whole, the 
more the details lose their independent qualities. The details turn out to be 
differentiations. To exemplify the contrast of possible decisions we may refer, 
on the one hand, to Egyptian art, where all emphasis is given to the single 
figures, while their connection is reduced to a mere rule of sequence; on the 
other hand, to the modern art of impressionism, where the picture is conceived 
as a unity whose details have no independent meanings.176
 
 
It is in this sense that we have to understand Wind’s scheme. In Zur Systematik 
der künstlerischen Probleme, he traces a kind of map onto which he places the categorical 
antithesis in relation to the phenomenological conditions of objectivity of the artistic in 
the visual field: he builds a scheme of fundamental artistic problems according to which 
it is possible to interrogate a visual artwork. Each one of these problems, each one of 
these antithetical pairs - nine, grouped by three in three spheres - is located in a 
different region (Region), i.e. in a different place (Ort) in which the categorical antithesis 
fullness-form is applicable to the visual art. So, Wind identifies nine layers, places 
 
176Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 355-356. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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(Orte), of the visual, where the immanent Sinn,177 the style, the Kunstwollen, can be 
tested.178 As he writes in his Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, his scheme is 
based on the analysis of three spheres - i.e. of three levels - of the whole field of the 
visual:179 1) the sphere of the ‘qualitative appearance’ (die Sphäre der »qualitativen 
Erscheinung«),180 2) the sphere of the ‘appearing thing’ (die Sphäre des »erscheinenden 
Dings«) and 3) the sphere of the ‘self-expressing life’ (die Sphäre des »sich äußernden 
Lebens«).181
Before moving on to the analysis of the scheme, I think it important to stress 
that Wind is not describing different particular examples from art history in order to 
generalize by means of abstract concepts. Rather, as we have already seen in the case of 
the comparison between Egyptian art and Impressionism, he is delineating the 
common loci on which, particularly within the sphere of the visual, it is possible to 
imagine an objective confrontation between different or chronologically distant styles. 
Each one of the antithetical pairs examined by Wind, and constituting part of his 
scheme, is articulated, at the same time, in each style; or, more accurately, each style 
can be seen as a different particular articulation of each of the antithetical pairs. In this 
sense, the references to Egyptian art and Impressionism, or to Greek art, are not to be 
understood as examples referring only to one or other specific contrast: Rather, they 
serve the purpose of illustrating how each one of the antithetical pairs, the principles 
for a regulated art interrogation, can be used to regulate our interrogation of visual art, 
and, at the same time, they serve the purpose of showing how the particularity of each 
style can be objectively respected in a confrontation no longer based on taste or 
empirical conditions, but, rather, on our way of approaching art. 
 Then, as mentioned above, each sphere of this tripartite scheme is again 
divided into three further regions. 
1) In ‘the sphere of ‘qualitative appearance’’ (Die Sphäre der »qualitativen 
Erscheinung«),182 Wind delineates only the first level of the visual: the level of the 
purely sensuous forming (rein sinnliche Gestaltung).183
 
177Which we suppose to be ruling an object when we interrogate it as a work of art. 
 In this sphere, the appearance (die 
Erscheinung) is considered in a qualitative sense. I believe this consideration does not 
particularly relate to the fact that the elements - both formal and material - of the 
conceptual pairs grouped under this sphere are pure, i.e. considered as a pair of two 
ideal opposite elements. The ideality, in fact, is supposed to be shared by all the 
elements of the conceptual pairs proposed by Wind: they are all ideally considered: 
they result from a speculative reflection, whatever their sphere or their region may be. In 
particular, I believe that the qualitative sense Wind gives to this first sphere is much 
more related to the fact that here he is only considering the conditions of the visual in 
their pure usage, i.e. he is not considering the concept of a particular emerging thing, 
which, as I shall show later, is going to be the object of the second sphere of the visual. 
178Just as we can interrogate a work of art in general (überhaupt) only by seeing it as a solution to an ideal 
problem set by the thought, so, according to Wind, for the interpretation of the figurative art it is possible 
and necessary to point out also the places where the fundamental categorical antithesis is applicable to the 
visual sphere. 
179Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458-474. 
180Concerned with the analysis of the elementary values and the elementary layers of the visual sphere. It 
was already introduced by Wind in his doctoral dissertation and explicitly borrowed by Panofsky in his 
essay Erwin Panofsky, ‘Über das Verhältnis’, 129-161. 
181Both spheres 2) and 3) refer to less elementary levels of analysis of the visual sphere. 
182Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
183Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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So, at this preliminary stage, Wind shows how the fundamental investigative category 
Fülle-Form takes the shape of three different layers of opposed values for the 
investigation of the visual, three layers on which the investigation of the visual art can 
be carried out: a) articulation (Artikulation); b) spatiality (Räumlichkeit); c) organization 
(Gliederung). None of them, as Wind underlines, has ‘yet any real significance’:184 they 
‘belong to that first level of the visible which itself does not yet ‘contain’ anything 
objective, although the objects ‘exhibit’ themselves in it’.185
a) In the first region of the first sphere of the visual
 
186 - the region called by 
Wind the region of the Artikulation187 - Wind sets the preliminary adaptation of the 
categorical antithesis in the visual field: he is concerned with the relation between the 
haptical and the optical values. As I have shown, Wind deduces, a priori, the 
fundamental antithetical category fullness-form from the necessary opposition-
combination between the two functions of the consciousness, i.e. between sensation 
(Empfindung) and intuition (Anschauung). So, in this different context, I believe that he 
is perfectly and coherently proceeding in the opposite direction, since he is now 
explicitly showing that the first step of the schematic conversion of the fullness-form 
category into the field of the visual necessarily relates to the opposition-relation 
between visual sensation (Empfindung) and visual intuition (Anschauung).188 The first 
‘sticks to the simple ‘presence’ of the sensuous contents as such’,189 the other ‘goes 
beyond, to what the contents objectively ‘mean’’.190 So, borrowing a term from 
phonetics, Wind defines their relationship as ‘articulation’, asserting that ‘when the 
intuition is focussed in this way on something objective, which ‘exhibits’ itself in a 
sensuous way, but absolutely without being absorbed by the sensuous, it [the intuition] 
causes an articulation within the sensuous itself, since only through this can an 
organization [of the sensuous] under the objective191 be made possible’.192 ‘In the 
linguistic field the sensuous sounds prove to be suitable for the exhibition193 of words 
only because they let themselves be organized into determined objects (the symbols of 
the concept), but, on its part, this organization requires, as a condition, that the sounds 
be among themselves in a regulated relation’.194
 
184‘entbehren noch jeder dinglichen Bedeutung’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
 The same thing also happens within 
185‘gehören jener vordersten Schicht des Sichtbaren an, welche, obwohl die Gegenstände sich in ihr 
»darstellen«, doch selbst noch nichts Gegenständliches »enthält«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
186Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
187Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463-464. 
188Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
189‘verharrt bei dem einfachen »Dasein« der sinnlichen Inhalte als solcher’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 
462. 
190‘geht darüber hinaus auf das, was die Inhalte gegenständlich »besagen«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 
462. 
191I.e. ‘a classification [of the sensuous] into the objective’, or ‘an arrangement [of the sensuous] into the 
class of the objective’. 
192‘indem [...] die Anschauung so auf ein Gegenständliches gerichtet ist, das sich sinnlich »darstellt«, ohne 
doch im Sinnlichen aufzugehen, bedingt sie eine Artikulation innerhalb des Sinnlichen selbst, da ja erst 
hierdurch eine Zuordnung an das Gegenständliche ermöglicht wird’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462. 
See also Wind’s comparison between thinker and artist in Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 
356-357. 
193The German word is Darstellung, which could also be translated by the word representation. 
194‘auf sprachlichem Gebiet die sinnlichen Laute sich für die Darstellung von Worten erst dadurch als 
geeignet erweisen, daß sie sich bestimmten Gegenständen (den Begriffs-symbolen) zuordnen lassen, diese 
Zuordnung aber ihrerseits zur Voraussetzung hat, daß die Laute unter sich in einer geregelten Beziehung 
stehen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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the visual field, where ‘the regulated understanding of objects is tied to a regulation of 
the sensuous as such’.195 So, this articulation, this purely sensuous order (rein sinnliche 
Ordnung),196 is the preliminary basic condition for any exhibition of objects. What Wind 
is maintaining is that the sensuous material must already be purely articulated - i.e. 
regulated as such - by the Anschauung, logically before any exhibition of an object and, 
precisely, in order to make the exhibition of an object possible. This articulation, as 
Wind says, ‘is based, within the visual field, on the realization of a determined balance 
between haptical and optical values’.197 Every distinction between a line and a spot, or 
between tracing two lines instead of two spots, every determination of this kind has its 
particular form in a balance between the two poles of haptical and optical values.198 
This sheds some light on why Wind calls the optical-haptical antithesis the principle of 
the ‘sensuous-elementary values’ (das Prinzip der »sinnlich-elementaren Werte«):199
 
  
the word ‘element’ protects us against the wrong idea that we had to deal with 
‘mere sensations’; because elements belong always to a systematic connection. 
But the adjective ‘sensuous’ indicates, on the other hand, that this systematic 
connection itself lies on this side of all that is thinkable or real. This is because it 
is quintessential to the articulation to develop pure within the sensuous; 
although, in this way, the articulation produces structures which thanks to their 
lawlike determination can be referred to objects.200
 
 
In this sense, as we read in Wind’s Theory of Art versus Aesthetics, ‘by 
determining his standpoint between these principles the artist creates a rule of 
articulation’:201 this means that the choices of the single artist, are grouped by Wind by 
resorting to the notion of style, through which ‘he thinks that the aesthetic object turns 
into an object of Kunstwissenschaft’202 since ‘the style [...] gives to the whole of the 
phenomena a legislation - in which also the individuality of the artistic fact finds a 
place - and carries out an objectifying function’.203
 
195‘hängt [...] das geregelte Erfassen von Gegenständen mit einer Regelung des Sinnlichen als solchem 
zusammen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. 
 There are various gradations of the 
rule of articulation, one for every style, and the same variety is also found in the other 
rules of coherence defining the relation between the elements of the other antithetical 
pairs investigated by Wind. Every balance between the terms of the determined 
antithesis, every decision taken by the single artist, is led back by Wind to a more 
196Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. 
197Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. 
198Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463.  
199Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. 
200‘Das Wort »Element« schützt vor der falschen Vorstellung, als ob wir es mit »bloßen Empfindungen« zu 
tun hätten; denn Elemente gehören stets einem Systemzusammenhang an. Das Beiwort »sinnlich« aber 
weist darauf hin, daß dieser Systemzusammenhang selbst wiederum diesseits alles Gedanklichen oder 
Dinglichen liegt. Denn zum Wesen der Artikulation gehört es, daß sie sich rein im Sinnlichen entfaltet; 
wenngleich sie eben dadurch Gebilde hervorbringt, die sich dank ihrer gesetzmäßigen Bestimmtheit auf 
Gegenstände beziehen lassen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. 
201Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 357. 
202‘ritiene che l'oggetto estetico si trasformi in un oggetto di Kunstwissenschaft’, Silvia Ferretti, ‘Edgar Wind: 
dalla filosofia alla storia dell'arte’, 348. 
203‘lo stile [...] dà all'insieme dei fenomeni una legislazione in cui trova posto anche l'individualità del fatto 
artistico, e adempie a una funzione oggettivante’, Silvia Ferretti, ‘Edgar Wind: dalla filosofia alla storia 
dell'arte’, 348. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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comprehensive balance corresponding to a precise stylistic choice.204
Justifying himself by the problematic nature of Riegl’s approach to art, Wind 
refers again to the Riegelian work for examples which can help him illustrate his own 
proposal to find a possible objective ground for the confrontation of styles. So, 
Egyptian art, for instance, which is clearly addressed towards the haptical - i.e. formal - 
values, does nevertheless require contours and colours - although it does not accord 
any value to them - in order to make the formal values concretely intuitive (konkret-
anschaulich).
 
205 Greek art proposes ‘an intermediate balance between these two orders’, 
between the optical and the haptical, and differs from late Roman art, ‘in which optical 
values dominate’.206
b) The second layer of the first sphere of the visual is the region of spatiality 
(Räumlichkeit) and is based on the antithetical pair surface-depth (Fläche-Tiefe).
 
207 
Starting from the statement that all the visual contents develop in space and that every 
chromatic phenomenon is tied to an extension, Wind refers back to his remarks about 
optical and haptical values, i.e. that the visual content does not have to be understood 
as a mere sensation (als bloße Empfindung) but, rather, as an articulated structure (ein 
artikuliertes Gebilde).208 Accordingly, we inevitably have to consider ‘also its [the visual 
content’s] spatial complex as structured’.209 For this second region too, in fact, and the 
same is true of the third, Wind does not neglect to emphasize that his investigation is 
still proceeding within a qualitative scope, still avoiding any real significance (jeder 
dinglichen Bedeutung). So, ‘the assessment of the spatial values - which is based on their 
position between surface and depth - goes hand in hand with the valuation of the 
sensuous qualities - which is based on their proportion to the optical and the 
haptical’.210
The concretely intuitive (konkret-anschaulich) space differs from the geometric 
 Both are to be estimated on the basis of their balance between the pair of 
opposite poles. 
 
204As Wind writes: ‘Thus, as every style makes its decision between haptical and optical, surface and 
depth, between distinct individual values and amorphous unitary values, so it also catches a particular 
balance between schematic and individual components of the ‘thing’’ (‘Wie nun jeder Stil zwischen 
Haptischem und Optischem, Fläche und Tiefe, zwischen distinkten Einzel- und amorphen Einheitswerten 
seine Entscheidung trifft, so schafft er auch einen besonderen Ausgleich zwischen der schematischen und 
der singulären Komponente des »Dings«’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464-465. It is important to stress 
here that the subject of this sentence is style. Clearly, this does not relate to a highly improbable 
psychological turn in Wind’s interpretation of style. Rather, if we hold to the interpretation of the notion of 
style as a logical unitary principle, it is possible to see that Wind again means that each time we have to 
measure the immanent unitary principle - we can call it style or Kunstwollen - by means of the pairs of 
antithetical values. Every balance between each of the antithetical pairs can be seen as the result of a 
stylistic choice. We can attribute this choice to the artist. But, actually, from a transcendental point of view, 
this way of approaching art always relates to the fact that we interrogate an artwork seeing it as the result 
of a choice, as a solution to a problem which - to be honest with ourselves - we ideally pose in order to see 
the artwork as a solution, i.e. in order to be able to interpret the object as an artwork. Nevertheless, it is 
evident that the artist too has to respect these ‘linguistic’ rules. 
205Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 450. 
206‘bei welcher die optischen Werte dominieren’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 450. 
207Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463-464. 
208Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
209‘auch den zugehörigen Raumkomplex als gegliedert anzusehen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. 
210‘Hand in Hand mit der Bewertung der sinnlichen Qualitäten nach ihrem Verhältnis zum Optischen und 
Haptischen geht also die Abschätzung der Raumwerte nach ihrer Stellung zwischen Fläche und Tiefe’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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particularly because of its bidimensionality.211 According to Wind, within the visual 
intuition of space (Raumanschauung) there is no extension in the first dimension as 
there is in geometry: ‘Here, the awareness of the extension begins only with the 
surface, and the actual form of the space displays itself in the relation between this 
lowest concretely intuitive dimension and the immediately higher, i.e. in the relation 
between the superficial values and the values of depth’.212 This distinction between 
geometric space and concretely intuitive space shows how the connection between the two 
dimensions, between surface and depth - the connection from which the intuitive form 
of the space results, has to be understood: ‘it brings [...] a balance between two opposite 
orders’.213 Surface (Fläche) and depth (Tiefe) are heterogenous and absolutely not 
comparable. In their correlation, none of them can be defined as a ‘widening’ of the 
other, nor as a development from a lower level to a higher (as happens in geometry, 
where we have the widening of the line into surface, and of the surface into solid).214
For spatiality (Räumlichkeit) too, Wind proposes some examples.
 
215 The first is 
Egyptian art, where we find a radical preference for the surface (Fläche) and a radical 
devaluation of the background, of the depth (Tiefe). In this case too, as before with the 
relation between haptical and optical values, it is not possible to have only a single pole 
of the antithesis. We can only talk about a ‘conflict between ‘pattern’ and 
‘background’’216 since, even if deprived of every value, the background turns out to be 
always necessary: otherwise, the figures would not be distinguishable. Classic Greek 
art, then, shows emancipation of the depth and takes the antithesis surface-depth to a 
point of equilibrium. The pyramidal construction, in the compositions 
(Kompositionen)217
c) The third region regards the values of the organization (Gliederung), i.e. ‘the 
relation between ‘whole’ and ‘part’’,
 of the Renaissance must also be understood as a balance between 
values of the surface and of the depth. 
218 the opposition between ‘distinct single values 
and amorphous unitary values’,219 between division (Zerteilung) and merging 
(Verschmelzung).220 According to Wind, for the valuation of the sensuous-elementary 
values - articulation (Artikulation) - and of the spatial values - spatiality (Räumlichkeit) - 
it was possible to concentrate either on a single detail or on the totality of the work. But 
‘the question of the ‘settlement’ goes beyond the balance between optical and haptical, 
between superficial values and values of depth’.221 In fact, although the organization is 
demonstrated by the sensuous and spatial elements, there is in this case a new 
separated problem which needs to be explicitly formulated.222
 
211Zweidimensionalität, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. 
 ‘Of course, this does not 
212‘Hier fängt das Bewußtsein der Ausdehnung erst mit der Fläche an, und die eigentliche Raumgestalt 
entfaltet sich in der Beziehung dieser niedersten konkret-anschaulichen Dimension zur nächst höheren, d. 
h. in dem Verhältnis von Flächen- und Tiefen-werten’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463. 
213‘vermittelt [...] einen Ausgleich zwischen zwei Gegensätzlichen Ordnungen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 
464. 
214Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
215Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 451 ff. I shall limit my analysis to some of them. 
216‘Auseinandersetzung zwischen »Muster« und »Grund«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 452. 
217Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 452. 
218‘das Verhältnis von »Ganzem« und »Teil«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
219‘distinkte Einzel- und amorphe Einheitswerte’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
220Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
221‘die Frage nach dem »Abschluß« weist über den Ausgleich zwischen optischen und haptischen, zwischen 
Flächen- und Tiefenwerten hinaus’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
222Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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detract from the fact that the decision about the values of organization is a direct 
consequence of the particular form of the balance between the optical and the haptical, 
or between surface and depth’.223
 
 Rather,  
after we have assigned to each one of the antithetical elements - both the 
haptical and the optical - its particular ‘place’,224 and after we have obtained in 
this way a polarity of the spatial values, we must now ask: Which form of the 
‘union’ corresponds to the haptical order, and which one to the optical? The 
answer rests on the polarity of the ‘values of the organization’, which are divided 
into distinct and amorphous, into single values and unitary values.225
 
  
‘Again, - in the case of this other rule of coherence - the individual morphological 
appearances can be interpreted as ‘balances’ between the two orders’.226
What are these rules of coherence in art? The artist also presents first of 
all a certain material of perception, sounds or colors - a conglomeration which 
is nothing, as long as it is not articulated. As far as visible arts are concerned, 
the problem of articulation is now identical with the problem which we 
formulated before;
 It is important 
to keep in mind that all the layers and all the spheres analysed by Wind are logically 
interconnected. This is what Wind himself states in Theory of Art versus Aesthetics when 
he asks himself: 
227
 
223‘Natürlich hindert dies nicht, daß mit der besonderen Form des Ausgleichs zwischen Optischem und 
Haptischem oder zwischen Fläche und Tiefe die Entscheidung hinsichtlich der Gliederungswerte 
unmittelbar zusammenhängt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
 the reconciliation of intensive and extensive values, of 
224It is important to note that in this Windian passage the word ‘place’ (»Ort«) appears in double quotes, so 
we have to take it in a particular sense. I believe that this detail is important for the comprehension of 
Wind’s theory since it avoids misunderstandings of Wind’s text. Here (on 453), Wind is clearly not talking 
about the place (Ort), or region (Region) in which the opposition-relation takes place, i.e., for instance, 
about the region of articulation or of spatiality. He is not talking about the place - the particular layer of the 
visual - to which the categorical antithesis can be applied. He is merely considering the fact that both the 
haptical and the optical values correspond respectively to specific ‘places’, i.e. to two different dimensions 
(surface and depth), which means that seeing a work of art as a particular balance between the haptical-
optical values necessarily involves the fact that we also have to see it as a particular balance between the 
opposed ‘places’ (i.e. dimensions) to which haptical and optical values ideally belong. The place in which 
these two dimensions (‘places’) are opposing is spatiality. Despite this, I suggest we stick to the contextual 
interpretation since, for instance, on page 473 Wind uses quotes and writes ‘places’ (»Orte«) although, 
there, he evidently refers to the layers of the visual and not to the dimensions. I have to admit that my 
interpretation - aimed at avoiding possible misunderstandings - results much more from the context of 
Wind’s text than from what might be defined as the ‘rule of quotes’, which is not always respected by 
Wind. However, in corroboration of my interpretation, I refer to what Wind writes about the second layer 
of the second sphere of the visual, in Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 465-466, discussed infra, 2),b). In this 
last passage Wind does not use quotes and only double-spaces the word Orten (only on page 465 and not 
on page 466 where he simply writes Orte without the double-space). Again, at the bottom of page 469, 
Wind uses the word ‘places’ (»Orte«), in double quotes, with the sense of dimensions (see infra 3),b)) as on 
page 453 (applying the rule I have called above the ‘rule of quotes’). 
225‘Nachdem wir jedem der gegensätzlichen Elemente, dem Haptischen wie dem Optischen, seinen 
besonderen »Ort« zugewiesen und so eine Polarität der »Raumwerte« gewonnen haben, müssen wir 
nunmehr fragen: Welche Form des »Zusammenschlusses« entspricht der haptischen, welche der optischen 
Ordnung? - Die Antwort ruht in der Polarität der »Gliederungswerte«, die in distinkte und amorphe, in 
Einzelwerte und Einheitswerte zerfallen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 453. 
226‘Wiederum lassen sich die einzelnen morphologischen Erscheinungen als »Ausgleiche« zwischen den 
beiden Ordnungen deuten’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 454. 
227Just before this passage, Wind was reflecting about the articulation in phonetics and, consequently, Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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form and tone, of line and spot. By determining his standpoint between these 
principles, the artist creates a rule of articulation. This rule necessarily involves 
a similar decision on the problem of space. The more an artist decides in favor 
of the line, the more he must decide in favor of the plane. This is why Egyptian 
art, which is the most linear art we know, is also the most flat in space. In order 
to develop its wonderful relations in the plane, it must disregard the third 
dimension. On the other hand, the more an artist decides in favor of the spot, 
the more he must decide in favor of depth. This is why impressionistic art 
excels in those open and airy landscapes where the space seems infinitely deep. 
Articulation and space being mutually related to each other, involve a certain 
kind of grouping: An artist who by working in spots creates a depth of space, 
cannot form details except by differentiation. An artist who by working in lines 
develops his figures in a plane, cannot form a unity except by composition.228
 
 
In Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, referring to Egyptian art and 
considering it as a balance between the values of the organization, Wind shows how it 
represents the triumph of separation over merging:229 it avoided as much as possible the 
unitary element, ‘partly by structuring in a ‘parallel’ way the figures facing each other, 
obtaining in this way a configuration where any binding strength was missing, - partly 
by taking the closely related figures from the beginning as a ‘structure of continuous 
mass’, closed in itself, so that no connecting medium was called for’.230 Greek art, on 
the other hand, ‘brings with the emancipation of ‘background’ also the emancipation of 
unitary values’.231 By freeing the distinct elements from their isolation and mitigating 
them with amorphous values (mit amorphen Werten), Greek art obtains an intermediate 
balance between unity and detail.232 In Dutch art he notes that distinct single values 
(distinkten Einzelwerte) are eliminated in favour of amorphous unitary values (amorphen 
Einheitswerte).233
2) While the first sphere of the visual, as we have just seen, only concerns the 
qualitative forming,
 
234 the second, the sphere of the ‘appearing thing’,235 goes beyond. The 
decision regarding all the problems of the first sphere determines the decision 
regarding a new problem: the ‘representation of things’.236 - which I would also call the 
visual sensuous exhibition of objects. Here, Wind focusses on the relation of 
representation (Darstellungsbeziehung), which ‘opens to us, in parallel to the qualitative 
sensory appearance, also the world of the ‘appearing thing’’.237
                                                                                                                                               
about the rules of coherence of understanding. See Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 356-357. 
 
228Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 357. 
229Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 454. 
230‘teils indem sie die einander zugewandten Gestalten »parallel« gliederte, so daß sich eine Konfiguration 
ergab, der jede bindende Kraft fehlte, - teils indem sie die zusammen gehörigen Figuren von vornherein 
als ein in sich geschlossenes, »massenkontinuierliches Gebilde« auffaßte, derart, daß gar kein 
verbindendes Medium in Anspruch genommen wurde’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 454. 
231‘bringt mit der Emanzipation des »Grundes« auch die Emanzipation der Einheitswerte’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 454. 
232Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 454-455. 
233Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 455. 
234The level of the purely sensuous forming (die Schicht der rein sinnlichen Gestaltung. 
235Die Sphäre des »erscheinenden Dings«, i.e. the sphere of the appearing object: the sphere concerning the 
representation, the exhibition, of the object. 
236Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 357. 
237‘eröffnet uns, parallel zu der qualitativen Sinneserscheinung, die Welt des »erscheinenden Dings«’, Edgar Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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a) The first region of the second sphere of the visual regards the antithesis 
between scheme (Schema) and individual quality (singuläre Qualität). Wind places 
emphasis on the individuality of the appearing thing, on the fact that the ‘thing’ is 
visible only if it has ‘visual features, which are necessarily individual’.238 He asserts that 
these features (Eigenschaften) must be connected through a scheme of the thing in order 
to demonstrate their belonging to the thing.239 So, while in the previous sphere, at the 
first level of the purely sensuous organization, Wind locates an antithesis between 
haptical and optical values, now, in correspondence with it, at the first layer of the 
second sphere, he locates an antithesis between two various aspects of thing-
appearance (zwei verschiedene Seiten der Dingerscheinung):240 between the schematic 
concept of form (die schematische Formvorstellung) and its individual fulfillment (ihre 
singuläre Erfüllung).241 Only their combination constitutes the concept of the ‘thing’ (den 
Begriff des »Dinges«).242
‘Thus’, - according to Wind - ‘as every style takes its decision between haptical 
and optical, surface and depth, between distinct individual values and amorphous 
unitary values, so it also catches a particular balance between schematic and individual 
components of the ‘thing’’.
 A schematic construction lacking in singular qualities would be 
equivalent in fact to the concept of a mere sign, while singular qualities lacking in 
schematic bond would constitute only a simple aggregate, where every ‘real’ meaning 
(‘dingliche’ Bedeutung) would be missing. 
243 Also on this level, then, a comparison between styles is 
made possible. Egyptian art, for instance, ‘eliminates the singular differences in favour 
of a separated homogeneity’244 since it creates fixed schemes (feste Schemata) for the 
objects it means to represent (für die darzustellenden Gegenstände).245 The Impressionist, 
on the other hand, focusses precisely on individuality (gerade das Singuläre).246 
According to Wind, he tries to get rid of all the formulaic bonds, since they would 
conceptually (begrifflich) dim ‘the pure ‘seeing’, on which, exclusively, he grounds his 
own conception of the thing’.247
                                                                                                                                               
Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
 In this case also, classic art represents an intermediate 
238‘visuelle Eigenschaften, die notwendig singulär sind’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
239Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
240Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
241Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
242Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464. 
243‘Wie nun jeder Stil zwischen Haptischem und Optischem, Fläche und Tiefe, zwischen distinkten Einzel- 
und amorphen Einheitswerten seine Entscheidung trifft, so schafft er auch einen besonderen Ausgleich 
zwischen der schematischen und der singulären Komponente des »Dings«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 
464-465. As Wind writes in Theory of Art versus Aesthetics: ‘Visible objects appear in those spots or lines, in 
this form of space and this mode of arrangement. In order to be visible, these objects must have individual 
qualities; but in order to belong to an object these qualities must be bound by a general scheme. The 
scheme and the individual qualities are necessarily related; but both are necessarily in conflict with each 
other. The artist’s decision, whether he lets the schematic or the individual side of his objects prevail, 
depends upon his decision with regard to the other problems’, in Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus 
Aesthetics’, 357. 
244‘hebt die singulären Verschiedenheiten zugunsten einer abstrakten Gleichartigkeit auf’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 465. 
245Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 465. 
246Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 465. 
247‘das reine »Sehen«, auf das er seine Dingauffassung ausschließlich gründet’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 465. As Wind writes in Theory of Art versus Aesthetics: ‘Again we can show that the linear 
character of Egyptian art involves a schematic presentation of objects, while the ‘luminerism’ of 
impressionistic art emphasizes their individual qualities’, in Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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combination between the two poles of the antithesis.248
b) The second region of the second sphere of the visual regards the antithesis 
between ideality (Idealität) and reality (Realität). While within the sensuous-elementary 
values the question of the place
 
249 - i.e. the attempt to define the dimensions250 to which 
the optical principle251 and the haptical principle belong - referred to the determination 
of the spatial position, in this case, i.e. in relation to the factors of the ‘appearing thing’ 
(des »erscheinenden Dings«), this question must be regarded in an ontological sense.252 
According to Wind, in fact, a different way-of-being (Seins-Art) - and not a dimension - 
corresponds to the individual feature and to the general scheme, as the first one is a real 
given fact, and the second one an ideal construction.253 Thus, the ‘thing’ (das »Ding«),254 
which ‘results from a union between scheme and individual way of appearing’,255 is 
located in a middle zone between the world of the individual (das Einzelne) and the 
world of the general (das Allgemeine), i.e. between reality and ideality. In this sense, the 
thing ‘unites [...] ideal status with real existence’.256
Among the infinite possible combinations between these two poles, Wind 
analyses the solution represented by classic art and indicates it as an intermediate 
balance (mittlere Ausgleich) between the poles represented by ‘idealism’ (»Idealismus«) 
and ‘realism’ (»Realismus«), which are obviously never totally achievable, either by 
Egyptian art or by Impressionism. 
 
c) The third region of the second sphere of the visual is the place of the 
opposition between the continuous flow (unausgesetztes Verfließen) and the rigid separation 
(strenge Sonderung), between the way in which ‘the individual moments unfold their 
existence’ and the way in which, ‘contrasting with them, the schematic constructions 
affirm their status’.257
                                                                                                                                               
Aesthetics’, 357. 
 It is the region of the opposition between ‘separation’ 
(»Trennung«) and ‘connection’ (»Verbindung«). While the first class, the individual 
248Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 465. 
249Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 465-466. 
250Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 465-466. In particular, see also supra 1),b) and footnotes, and 3),b). 
251I believe Wind does not contradict himself by defining as principles the values such as the optical and the 
haptical, as the individual and the schematic. This definition recurs in Wind’s doctoral dissertation (in 
particular 175-205) and in his article, also in relation to other values. This can quite easily be explained if 
we think that a style in which, for instance, the haptical values prevail over the optical is still an organizing 
principle of ideal unitary coherence. So, with the term haptical principle, Wind is, in my opinion merely 
referring to a particular way - in this case the haptical - of having a Sinn, a style, a unitary rule of coherence 
in art. And this is also justified if we consider that Wind was developing Panofsky’s proposed search for a 
transcendental alternative to Wölfflin’s Grundbegriffe. Also Panofsky himself, in 1920, used the word 
Prinzipien, though not yet in this particular sense (see Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, 321-
339). Then, after Wind’s doctoral dissertation, Panofsky himself in 1925 used this word quite often in this 
particular Windian sense (see Erwin Panofsky, 1925, ‘Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur 
Kunsttheorie: ein Beitrag zu der Erörterung über die Möglichkeit „kunstwissenschaftlicher 
Grundbegriffe“’, 129-161). Further on this, see Jan Bialostocki, ‘Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968)’, 74. 
252Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 465-466. 
253Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 466. 
254Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 466. 
255‘das aus einer Vereinigung von Scheme und singulärer Erscheinungsweise hervorgeht’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 466. 
256‘vereinigt [...] ideellen Bestand mit reellem Dasein, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 466. 
257‘die singulären Momente ihr Dasein entfalten’ and ‘ihnen gegenüber die schematischen Gebilde ihren 
Bestand bewähren’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 466. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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contents,258 constantly follow one another,259 the second, the schemes (die Schemata), 
‘connect and separate the given qualities according to their belonging to the thing’.260 
For instance, when the artistic decision is for individuality and reality - as happens in 
the highest degree in Impressionism - the uniform-qualitative relation (gleichmäßig-
qualitative Zusammenhang) prevails and overcomes the diversities of the forms of the 
thing (die Verschiedenheiten der Dingformen).261 On the other hand, the opposite occurs 
when the decision is inclined to the schematic-ideal (zum Schematisch-Ideellen) relation - 
for instance the extreme case of Egyptian art, i.e. when the things appear sharply 
separated from each other.262 Classical art represents the intermediary solution 
between the two terms of the antithesis. The equivalence (Gleichwertigkeit) reached by 
classical art in the correlation of whole and part constitutes ‘a decisive mark of the so-
called ‘organic’ forming’.263 This mark, however, only pertains to the external aspect of 
the ‘organic’ forming, since the essence of the organic (das Wesen des Organischen) goes 
beyond the determinations of the ‘appearing thing’264 and, above all, has its fulfillment 
‘in the form of the ‘self-expressing life’’.265
3) As we have seen, the first sphere of the visual - that of the purely sensuous 
forming (rein sinnliche Gestaltung) - is linked with the second sphere - that of the 
‘appearing thing’ (des »erscheinenden Dings«) - by means of the ‘relation of 
representation’ (»Darstellungsbeziehung«).
 
266 So, the ‘appearing thing’ for its part can 
refer to the world of ‘feeling’ or of ‘life’267 by means of the ‘relation of expression’ 
(»Ausdrucksbeziehung«).268 While the first connection concerns the relationship between 
the visual appearance and what is visually appearing,269 - i.e. the use of the purely sensuous 
form as a medium for the comprehension of the self-presenting things, now, the access 
to the third sphere of the visual requires us to pass ‘from the outside, which presents to 
us the thing as an appearance, to its inside [to the inside of the thing], as long as it [the 
thing] expresses itself in it [in its inside].’270
 
258Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 466. 
 
259Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 466. 
260‘binden und trennen die gegebenen Qualitäten je nach ihrer dinglichen Zugehörigkeit’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 466. 
261Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 466. 
262‘erscheinen die Dinge scharf voneinander getrennt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 466-467. 
263‘ein entscheidendes Merkmal der sogenannten »organischen« Gestaltung’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 467. 
264Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
265‘in der Form des »sich äußernden Lebens«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
266Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. As I have noted above, the word »Darstellungsbeziehung« could also 
be translated as ‘relation of exhibition’. 
267‘Welt des »Gefühls« oder »Lebens«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
268Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
269Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
270‘von der Außenseite, welche uns das Ding als Erscheinung darbietet, auf dessen Inneres, sofern es sich 
darin ausdrückt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. For Wind: ‘We go in this way a second step away 
from the purely visual, as it was offered to us by the previous layer. While the ‘appearing thing’ still 
represents itself in a visible way, although (as thing) it does not realize itself in the visible, so the ‘feeling’ 
does not have any more a direct relationship to the visible; since it let itself indirectly be perceived only as 
far as, on its part, the ‘thing’, in which it expresses itself, ‘appears’. Exactly in this mediate manner, 
however, it necessarily belongs to the phenomenological status of the visual’ (‘Wir entfernen uns damit 
um eine weitere Stufe von dem rein Visuellen, wie es uns die vorderste Schicht bot. Während das 
»erscheinende Ding« sich noch sichtbarlich darstellte, wenn es auch selbst (als Ding) nicht im Sichtbaren 
aufging, so hat das »Gefühl« gar keine direkte Beziehung zum Sichtbaren mehr; denn es läßt sich nur Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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a) Wind stresses the similarity between the first antithesis enclosed in the 
concept of the ‘appearing thing’ (i.e. the first antithesis of the second sphere), and the 
first antithesis enclosed in the concept of the ‘self-expressing feeling’ (i.e. the first 
antithesis of the third sphere).271 In the first case, the thing required individual visual 
features in order to be able to exhibit itself in a visible way.272 Now, in the second case, 
the feeling must become firmly established as a formula in order to be mimically 
expressible.273 So, once again, Wind takes the line of reasoning to the necessary 
connection between the two opposite elements of the antithesis, i.e., here - in the first 
layer of the third sphere of the visual -, to the necessity of interrogating the artworks as 
if they were balances between animation (Belebung) and fixation (Statuierung), between 
feeling (Gefühl) and stillness (Status). As we read in Theory of Art versus Aesthetics: 
‘There is no expression of life without a formula. But the formula, in order to be 
expressive, must be animated’.274
Wind refers only to some of the possible examples, since in this case too ‘the [...] 
sought connection can still vary in the most different ways.
 
275 So, for instance, in 
Egyptian art there is such a limitation of the vital aspect of the represented figures, that 
their action is reduced to a simple pose.276 Impressionism, on the other hand, limits the 
presence of the formula to the point where ‘every formula, and therefore every 
possibility of a language of gestures’,277 and ‘the feeling expressed in its landscapes’ are 
dissolved ‘into a mere mood’.278
b) The pair constituted by the concepts of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, which - as 
I have illustrated - has been demonstrated by Wind as unsuitable for the role of the 
original categorical antithesis,
 
279 has its right place ‘within the material (and therefore 
special)280 region of the ‘self-expressing life’’.281
                                                                                                                                               
insoweit mittelbar wahrnehmen, als das »Ding«, in dem es sich ausdrückt, seinerseits »erscheint«. Gerade in 
dieser vermittelten Weise gehört es aber notwendig zum phänomenologhischen Bestand des Visuellen 
hinzu’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
 So, if we see the subject (Subjekt) as ‘the 
271Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
272Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
273Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
274‘The problem of presentation is closely connected with the problem of expression. The artist’s way of 
presenting his figures determines the figure’s way of expressing its life. Life, in order to be expressed, 
must be formulated. There is no expression of life without a formula. But the formula, in order to be 
expressive, must be animated. There is no expressive formula without life. However, the more importance 
we give to life as such, the more we must reduce the value of the formula; and the more we emphasize the 
importance of the formula, the more we must disregard the value of life. Here again we have a relation 
and at the same time an antithesis. Egyptian art decided to restrain the life of its figures to such an extent 
that their action was reduced to a mere pose. Impressionistic art decided to reduce formulas to such an 
extent, that the feeling expressed in its landscapes was dissolved into a mere mood. Between these two 
extremes lie thousands of other possibilities. Thousands of decisions are possible. But every one has its 
consequences according to the system of artistic problems’, in Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus 
Aesthetics’, 357-358. 
275‘die [...] geforderte Verbindung kann aber wieder in der mannigfachsten Weise varieren’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 467. 
276With the word ‘pose’ I have tried to translate here the particular Windian use of the word ‘Stellung’. 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 468. 
277Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 469. 
278Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 358. In German, Wind uses the expression ‘in eine bloße 
»Stimmung«’, see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 469. 
279Since it ‘cannot be formally deduced’ (‘sich nicht formal deduzieren ließ’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 469. 
280Using the adjective speziell (special), Wind refers to the particular case, i.e., in this instance to a schematic Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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source of the expression of life (and not [as] the ‘I’ of the theory of knowledge)’,282 and the 
object (Objekt) as ‘the product of the expression of life (and not [as] the ‘object’ 
(»Gegenstand«) of the theory of knowledge)’,283 then subject and object constitute the two 
opposite ‘places’ (gegensätzliche »Orte«) to which feeling and stillness - the two poles of 
the forming of the expression (Ausdrucksgestaltung) - respectively belong.284 In this 
sense, to every connection between fixation (Statuierung) and animation (Belebung) 
there therefore corresponds ‘a balance between the finished world of the objects and 
the eternally flowing world of the subject’.285
c) While the subjective world of the feelings (Gefühle) ‘unfolds itself in a constant 
flow and requires the fixation in formulas, i.e. the objectifying separation’,
 
286 the 
objective world of the formulas (Formeln) ‘is based on the rigid isolation of its 
constructions and therefore requires animation through feeling, which ‘flows’ into it 
bringing unity’.287 So, it is not difficult to guess that, for Wind, the last region of the 
third sphere of the visual is the region of conflict between these two last ‘orders’ 
(»Ordnungen«): vital flowing (lebendiges Verfließen) and rigid isolation (starre 
Isolierung).288
In this case too, Wind cites examples: Egyptian art is ruled by rigid isolation and 
the principle of vital flowing has become a rule of disposition (Regel der Anordnung) 
‘connecting the positions of the single parts with the position of the entire figure’.
 
289 
‘‘The position’ of an Egyptian figure, which has to be grasped in isolation, is built from 
the ‘positions’ of its limbs, which also have to be grasped in isolation’.290 The 
intermediate balance between the two poles of the antithesis is reached again by classic 
art, which determines a vital correlation of the action, so that in the artwork there are 
‘relatively independent partial actions, which combine and complement each other 
within the entire action’.291
                                                                                                                                               
particularization of the categorical antithesis. 
 The transition to the impressionistic pure mood is 
represented - for Wind - by Rembrandt’s ‘aura’ (»Fluidum«), i.e. the atmosphere which 
connects all the forms together in the Dutch artist’s late works. Actually, the ‘aura’ 
operates among the people acting in the represented scene, who are still somehow 
separated, although this separation is only meant to be absorbed again in a coherent 
281‘innerhalb der materialen (und daher speziellen) Region des »sich äußernden Lebens«’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 469. 
282‘die Quelle der Lebensäußerung (und nicht: das erkenntnistheoretische »Ich«)’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 469. 
283‘das Produkt der Lebensäußerung (und nicht: den erkenntnistheoretischen »Gegenstand«)’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 469. 
284Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 469-470. 
285‘Ausgleich zwischen der fertigen Welt der Objekte und der ewig im Flusse begriffenen Welt des 
Subjects’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 470. 
286‘entfaltet sich in einem stetigen Fluß und bedarf der Statuierung in Formeln, d.h. der objektivierenden 
Sonderung’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 470, 
287‘ruht in der starren Isolierung ihrer Gebilde, bedarf daher der Belebung durch das Gefühl, das 
vereinheitlichend in sie »einströmt«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 470. 
288Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 470. 
289‘welche die Stellungen der einzelnen Teile zur Stellung der Gesamtfigur verbindet’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 470. 
290‘die isoliert zu fassende »Stellung« einer ägyptischen Figur baut sich aus den gleichfalls isoliert zu 
fassenden »Stellungen« ihrer Glieder auf’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 470. 
291‘relativ selbstständige Teilhandlungen, die innerhalb der Gesamthandlung ergänzend zueinander 
hinzutreten’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 470. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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action (zusammenhängende Handlung),292 in the flowing unity. On the other hand, the 
pure ‘mood’ (»Stimmung«) of Impressionism does not allow any separation at all in 
vital flowing.293
 
 
The role of the scheme and the importance of the really special problems 
 
The entire science of art (kunstwissenschaftliche Denken) conceived by Wind, his whole 
reflection on artistic problems (künstlerische Probleme), is grounded, as I have tried to 
show in this section, on a double methodological procedure: on the search for a 
fundamental antithetical conflict (grundlegende Antithetik) - ‘a tension from which the 
artistic appearances can be interpreted as ‘performances’’,294 and on the search for a 
regional scheme - ‘which makes possible the application of the antithetical conflict to 
the appearances’.295 The investigation of the artistic rules of coherence, of the rule of 
art, conducted by Wind can never be understood, however, as an attempt at localizing 
a norm - at least strictly speaking, but only as the analysis of a system of conditions, of 
transcendental tools for art interrogation.296
The style
 In this sense I believe it can be said that 
Wind introduced to art history a new way of thinking, a new way of looking at 
artworks. And this is because he went back to art interrogation as such, reflecting on it 
in a transcendental way and managing, as I have intensively and extensively illustrated 
in this section, to carry out what I would call a ‘Copernican revolution’ within the field 
of art interrogation. It is precisely this study of the rules of articulation of the artistic 
language which is, as we have seen, the main goal of Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft. And 
these rules - which are in no way psychologically established - reveal themselves only 
by means of a transcendental reflection on our way of approaching art. 
297 in art - like the causal relationship in the knowledge of nature for Kant 
- is not something empirically attainable, it is not the sum of manifold surveys,298
 
292Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471. 
 
293Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 470-471. 
294‘Spannung von der aus die künstlerischen Erscheinungen sich als »Leistungen« deuten lassen’, Edgar 
Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 474. 
295‘die Anwendung der Antithetik auf Erscheinungen möglich macht’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 474. 
A scheme which makes possible the comparison between styles, although independently of the 
presupposition of psychological constants, historical powers, historical empirical elements to be 
considered. Wind presents his Kunstwissenschaft as a response to Wölfflin’s purely formal approach, 
intending that the particularity of the artistic activity cannot be judged and respected by means of a 
merely formal description. 
296See Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 357-358. 
297And hence also the meaning (Sinn), the Kunstwollen. 
298The style of a work of art is not to be determined through a heap or a small piece of details we have 
empirically to pick up. Neither must it be intended as a purely historical or psychological product. Rather, 
we could say, the style, for Wind, is nothing but a sort of logical coherence that the artist and the 
interpreters of the artist’s work are supposed to respect and which each time has to be measured by means 
of the artistic problems. In this sense, it is interesting to read what Wind writes in 1922 about the weakness 
of Morelli’s method: ‘Ja, man muß sogar die Forderung stellen: Wo man im Dienste der Gruppenbildung 
spezielle Übereinstimmungen aufzuweisen sucht, wo man also auf einen engen Gruppenzusammenschluß 
hinauswill, da müssen die Übereinstimmungen zugleich vielseitig aufgewiesen werden! Bleibt die 
‘spezielle’ Gleichartigkeit vereinzelt, so kann sie eine Zusammengehörigkeit niemals verbürgen. Hier liegt 
die Schwäche der Morelli’schen Methode. Wer sein Augenmerk nur auf einzelne entlegene Details der 
Kunstwerke lenkt (auf Ohrformen, Fingernägel) und deren formale Übereinstimmung für 
ausschlaggebend erklärt, der ist vor willkürlichen Gruppierungen niemals sicher. Allerdings wurde 
Morelli zu dieser Beschränkung durch eine psychologische Theorie bestimmt, nach welcher die Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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rather, it is immanent in our way of seeing the artistic object, of seeing an object as 
artistic. I would say that for Wind we approach art stylistically. As we have seen, 
through the mediation of the scheme we can make the fullness-form category applicable 
to the artistic objects: we can trace a sort of Cartesian plane - of the phenomenological 
conditions - on which we can ideally place and organize works of art. Beginning from 
this premise, I would say that, for Wind, we do not interrogate art either on the basis of 
psychological default models or looking for deep structures.299 Rather, Wind wants to 
show that it is possible to make the work of art answer to our questions only if we 
interrogate it by means of some transcendental ‘linguistic’ tools, i.e. - putting it in a 
Kantian way - bearing in mind that we do not know the works of art in themselves, but 
only in accordance with our way of approaching art. But, unlike Kant and his theory of 
knowledge, as I have noted several times, Wind is not trying to show how we can give 
sense to the world of nature constituting the objects of our knowledge by means of the 
encounter between our categories and the data of experience. Rather, Wind’s 
Kunstwissenschaft respects the particularity of art - its being a pre-formed material - and 
has therefore only a regulative intent: it is aimed at showing how it is possible to re-
constitute the meaning of the already existing artistic objects, by seeing them as concretely 
given solutions - balances - to the ideal fullness-form antithesis. In this sense, then, the 
artistic problems I have illustrated above are still interpretative ideal tools, 
specializations of the Urproblem, orienting the art historian in his interrogation of art.300
                                                                                                                                               
Individualität des Künstlers sich gerade an solch ‘unwichtigen’ Stellen ‘verraten’ sollte. Ihn interessierte 
also nicht die morphologische Gleichartigkeit als solche, vielmehr verwandte er die morphologischen 
Bestimmungen nur als Mittel zum Zweck, - als ‘Indizien’ einer menschlichen Person. Solch eine 
‘kriminalistische’ Absicht liegt aber jenseits der Kunstwissenschaftlichen Fragestellung: Vorausgesetzt, die 
Morelli’sche Theorie wäre richtig, so wäre (- aus kriminalistischen Gründen -) gar nicht einzusehen, 
warum ein Künstler sich in einer früheren Entwicklungsstufe nicht durch genau die gleichen 
‘unwichtigen’ Merkmale ‘verraten’ sollte, wie in einer späteren. (Der Daumenabdruck eines MenSChen 
bleibt ja auch immer derselbe). Man würde also auf Grund der bestimmten Indizien beim Frühwerk wie 
beim Spätwerk auf ein- und dieselbe ‘Person’ stoßen und daraufhin eine unbedingte 
Zusammengehörigkeit der Kunstwerke befürworten. Das hieße aber: über der Identität der ‘Person’ die 
Verschiedenheit der ‘Stile’ ignorieren’, in Edgar Wind, Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand, 
169, n. 114. 
 
299I think it would be advisable to compare Wind’s ideas with what Guido Kaschnitz-Weinberg says in his 
Guido Kaschnitz-Weinberg, ‘Alois Riegl: Spätrömische Kunstindustrie’, Gnomon, 5, 1929, 195-213. There, 
emphasizing the importance of the new edition (1929) of Riegl’s Spätrömische Kunstindustrie (Late Roman 
Art Industry), Kaschnitz refers several times to Edgar Wind and to his ‘Zur Systematik der künstlerischen 
Probleme’, presenting Wind’s proposal as a really important and original rereading of Riegl’s own 
thought (despite - as Kaschnitz explicitly notes - the claim of Otto Pächt that there were no available 
significative approaches to Riegl’s thought). But I think it should not escape the reader that Kaschnitz, 
while presenting Riegl’s thought and underlining the importance of Wind’s approach, omits to stress the 
fact that Wind’s approach is transcendental. Although one could try to use the word ‘structures’ in order to 
define the role and the function of Wind’s artistic problems, one should never forget to specify that these 
‘structures’ are a priori and transcendentally deduced and, therefore, absolutely different from Kaschnitz’s 
own structures based on a psychological interpretation of Riegl’s Kunstwollen. By omitting this ‘detail’ 
Kaschnitz evidently interpreted Wind’s transcendental Kunstwissenschaft as if it were similar to his own 
approach to art. 
300Nevertheless, as Wind himself admits, the scheme has a double limitation: it is arbitrarily limited to the 
visual sphere of the appearance (visuelle Erscheinungssphäre), and it necessarily avoids any specific 
distinction between architecture, painting and sculpture. The first limitation is only aimed at narrowing 
the research field, while the fact remains that the other phenomenological spheres also - to which other 
arts may belong - can be investigated in parallel. The second limitation is justified because the differences 
between the arts of the visual field have nothing to do with artistic problems (in the narrow sense of the 
term). The nine pairs of concepts Wind localized within his scheme are entirely grounded on the formal Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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As emerges from Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, a ‘table of the artistic 
problems’ (»Tafel der künstlerischen Probleme«) entails the advantage of making possible 
the location of general laws which are also important on a methodological level. It can 
therefore be used ‘as a test for systematic judgments on art’.301 Moreover, for Wind, 
besides the nine places (Orte) constituting the table of the fundamental artistic 
problems, it is also possible to locate a further position (Stelle) in which the original 
problem (Urproblem) reveals itself: the layer of the antithesis between thing-appearance 
(Dingerscheinung) and the expressive content (Ausdrucksgehalt).302 In fact, as the relation 
of representation303 connects the sphere of the ‘sensuous appearance’ (der »sinnlichen 
Erscheinung«) with the sphere of the ‘appearing thing’ (des »erscheinenden Dings«), and 
the relation of expression304 connects the sphere of the ‘appearing thing’ (des 
»erscheinenden Dings«) with the sphere of the ‘self-expressing life’ (des »sich äußernden 
Lebens«), so also the comprehension of the figure of the thing (Erfassung der Dinggestalt) 
and the comprehension of the expressive content (Ausdrucksgehalt) are after the same 
determined aim and proceed in a one-sided direction.305 The first tends to move from 
individual qualities to the general scheme, the second from formal stasis to vital 
feeling.306
                                                                                                                                               
principle which makes the artistic performance in general possible (the fullness-form categorical antithesis) 
and on the phenomenological conditions (phänomenologischen Bedingungen) - corresponding to the 
conditions of objectivity in general - according to which this performance appears, but not grounded on the 
empirical conditions according to which the appearance is realized (see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471). 
The question about the difference between architecture, painting and sculpture is tied up with the 
formulation of another question, i.e. the research into the relationship between ‘the ideal elements out of 
which the artistic appearance of the work is composed’ (‘den ideellen Elementen, aus denen die künstlerische 
Erscheinung des Werkes sich aufbaut’) and ‘the real elements founding its empirical existence’ (‘den reellen 
Elementen, die seine empirische Existenz begründen’), between, for instance, the space formed in the artwork 
(dem im Kunstwerk gestalteten Raum) and the real space dem realen Raum to which the artwork as empirical 
object belongs. Wind postpones to another place the answer to this question, but he stresses that, as a 
justification of the non problematic nature of the matter, it may suffice to note that his nine ‘pairs of 
concepts can be applied in the same way to all the three kinds of art’ (‘Begriffspaare sich auf alle drei 
Kunstarten in gleicher Weise anwenden lassen’) - Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471. 
 Thus, if the two directions are analysed in the light of the original categorical 
antithesis between fullness and form, the result is that the aim of the relationship of 
representation (Darstellungsbeziehung) is on the side of ‘form’ (»Form«), while, by 
301‘zur Erprobung kunstwissenschaftlicher Urteile’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 472. Thanks to the 
observation of these lawlikenesses (Gesetzmäßigkeiten) (for the meaning of this term see supra and the 
Cambridge edition of the works of Kant), in fact, the determination of the way of forming 
(Gestaltungsweise) of a work of art, at least in relation to the sensuous-elementary values (sinnlich-
elementar), involves necessary consequences on the level of the spatial configuration (Raumbildung), of the 
composition (Gliederung), of the understanding of the thing (Dingauffassung), of the shaping of the 
expression (Ausdruckgestaltung). The knowledge of these law-governed relations allows us to start from a 
single determination and to reach in advance a decision relating to all the others. If the result of this 
conclusion does not agree with facts, then, the first determination - the analysis of the sensuous-
elementary - proves insufficient (see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473). Knowledge of the a priori 
lawlikenesses (apriorischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten) therefore gains the role the meaning of a methodical 
regulative (eines methodischen Regulativs) which Wind - as Buschendorf notes - ‘wants to give to the art 
historian [...]’ (‘will dem Kunsthistoriker [...] geben’), see Bernhard Buschendorf, ‘‘War ein sehr tüchtiges 
gegenseitiges Fördern’: Edgar Wind und Aby Warburg’, Idea. Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunsthalle, IV, 
1985, 169. 
302Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. 
303Darstellungsbeziehung, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. 
304Ausdrucksbeziehung, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. 
305See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. 
306Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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contrast, the aim of the expressive relation (Ausdrucksbeziehung) is on the side of 
‘fullness’ (»Fülle«).307
Despite this last observation, and despite the fact that the other nine antitheses 
localized by Wind explicitly represent only the fundamental problems (Grundprobleme) 
from which, in an endless variety, the single problems (Einzelprobleme) spring, there is 
still a feeling - of which Wind himself is also partially aware
 I believe this statement of Wind is important, precisely because it 
definitely illustrates the semantic framework within which the Windian concept of 
fullness (Fülle) is to be understood. Fullness therefore refers, ideally, to the content-
related element of a work of art at every level, from the merely material to the 
expressive content, and, consequently, it is opposed to and articulated with the form, 
which ideally represents the forms of intuition, the formal delimitation and, at this 
point, also composure and rigidity of expression. 
308 - that the table of the 
fundamental problems is poor and insufficient in comparison with the vastness of the 
artistic phenomena to which it is supposed to do justice.309
However, there is a passage from Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme 
which I believe is crucial to Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft, since it can be used for testing 
the validity of his transcendental proposition and because from it we can really see to 
what extent Wind himself acknowledges how difficult it is to uphold a strong 
 In spite of his various 
attempts, I believe this feeling remains very strong, particularly in relation to the 
difficulty Wind tried several times to confront: the need to take into consideration the 
particular cases, the single problems, the need to mediate among the original 
categorical antithesis (Urantithese) and single artworks, which made Wind formulate 
his scheme of the fundamental problems. In Kantian terms, Wind resorts to the scheme 
although, in my opinion, this does not resolve the problematic relation between 
empirics and theory which Wind meant to overcome through the foundation of a 
Kunstwissenschaft and from which we began our considerations: the scheme reveals 
itself as a linking tool between the original antithesis and single artworks, it certainly 
has at least a methodical-regulative value, but it does not seem entirely able to 
represent the infinite number of single cases or a sufficient alternative to the 
contemplative moment related to the aesthetic enjoyment of a work of art. 
 
307‘A special rivalry, between both the regions of the thing-appearance and of the expressive content as 
such, still joins the different polarities which result in their tension within the individual regions’ (‘gesellt 
sich zu den verschiedenen Polaritäten, die ihre Spannung innerhalb der einzelnen Regionen auswirken, 
noch eine besondere Rivalität zwischen den Regionen der Dingerscheinung und des Ausdrucksgehaltes 
als solchen’) - see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. Where the artistic decision (künstlerische 
Entscheidung) favours the ‘form’ (»Form«) - as in the case of the first Italian Renaissance, Greek art of the 
archaic period, Egyptian art, where it favours the haptical and the surface, the schematic and the ideal, the 
fixation and the objective (‘zugunsten des Haptischen und der Fläche, des Schematischen und des 
Ideellen, der Statuierung und des Objektiven’) - ‘in that case the thingness [the fact or character of being a 
thing] as a whole becomes predominant over the expression’ (‘dort hat auch die Dinglichkeit als Ganze 
notwendig das Übergewicht über den Ausdruck’) - see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. By contrast, where 
the choice favours the ‘fullness’ (»Fülle«) - as in the case of Impressionism , where it favours ‘the optical 
and the depth, the individual and the real, the feeling and the subjectivising’ (‘zugunsten des Optischen 
und der Tiefe, des Singulären und des Reellen, des Gefühls und der Subjektivierung’ - in that case ‘the 
expressive content also directs the actual attention to itself and reduces the meaning of the thingness’ (‘lenkt 
auch der Ausdrucksgehalt die eigentliche Aufmerksamkeit auf sich und vermindert die Bedeutung der 
Dinglichkeit’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473-474. Classical art, then, represents in this case too a point 
of intermediary balance between the two elements of the antithesis (see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 
474.). 
308Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 472. 
309See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471-474. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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transcendental position, to uphold the usage of ideal tools for the investigation of the 
manifoldness of experience. This passage is crucial for evaluation of the validity of the 
category and of the scheme and also because it opens a path towards the developments 
of Wind’s own approach to art. I am referring in particular to the passage where 
Wind’s investigation is explicitly focussed on the relationship between the scheme of 
the fundamental antitheses and the ‘multitude of the different problems which take turns 
in the course of historical development’:310 the question of the special problems (die 
speziellen Probleme).311 These occur when ‘instead of the intuitive values, which 
compete with each other on principle, one introduces particular representatives of 
value’.312 For instance, it is possible to speak about the ‘contrast between figure and 
space’313 only because ‘figure and space are considered as bearers of determined values 
(the figure, for instance, as a bearer of haptical values, the space as a bearer of optical 
values)’.314 To maintain that the space ‘devours’ the figures (der Raum ‘verschlinge’ die 
Figuren) is, for Wind, the same as saying that ‘the optical values dissolve the haptical 
ones, [that] the unitary values dominate the individual ones’.315 The only difference is 
that ‘the general antithesis shows itself in a quite special formulation’.316 Therefore, the 
introduction of the ‘bearer’ (»Träger«) limits the field of the artistic problems because it 
ties the values to determined empirical objects causing, in this way, the loss of the 
comprehensive applicability of the antitheses, since such ‘bearers’ are common only ‘to 
a limited choice of artworks’ (einer beschränkten Auswahl von Kunstwerken).317
Even more evident is the specification (Spezifizierung) of the artistic problem 
when it ‘is associated with a representational condition, as, for instance, when this 
condition is given through a determined theme’.
 
318 The case considered by Wind is one 
in which a ‘pre-artistic assignment’ (»vorkünstlerische Aufgabe«) becomes the foundation 
‘of the artistic problem, to be precise in such a way that the ‘assignment’ sets out the 
antithetical conflict of the problem’.319 Wind refers to the text in which Riegl derives 
‘the problems of the opinion and of the composition from the particularities of the 
commission’.320 The Riegelian problem to which Wind cross-refers here is that of the 
representation of the patrons within the picture, the problem arising when ‘many 
people are to be represented in full inactivity’321
 
310‘Vielheit der verschiedenen Probleme, die im Verlauf der historischen Entwicklung einander ablösen’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
 and ‘yet, at the same time, the outer 
311Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
312‘man für die anschauliche Werte, die grundsätzlich miteinander rivalisieren, besondere 
Wertrepräsentanten einsetzt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
313‘»Auseinandersetzung zwischen Figur und Raum«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
314‘man sowohl Figur wie Raum als Träger bestimmter Werte (etwa die Figur als Träger haptischer, den 
Raum als Träger optischer Werte) ansieht’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
315‘die optischen Werte lösen die haptischen auf, die Einheitswerte dominieren über den Einzelwerten’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
316‘die allgemeine Antithese in ganz spezieller Fassung auftritt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
317Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
318‘an eine gegenständliche Bedingung knüpft, wie sie etwa durch ein bestimmtes Thema gegeben ist’, 
Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
319‘des künstlerischen Problems, und zwar derart, daß die »Aufgabe« die Antithetik des Problems 
vorzeichnet’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
320‘die Probleme der Auffassung und der Komposition aus der Besonderheiten des Auftrags’, Edgar Wind, 
‘Zur Systematik’, 456. 
321‘Mehrere Personen sollen in völliger Handlungslosigkeit dargestellt werden’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur 
Systematik’, 456. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
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portrait similarity is demanded’.322 In this case, Wind affirms, ‘a rivalry must emerge 
between the ‘independent’ opinion and the ‘fixed image’: this means a conflict between 
‘attention’ and ‘will-expression’ for the psychological characterization of the figures, a 
conflict between loose vertical ranging (i.e. affirmation of the plane-relations) and bond 
through a normal scheme (i.e. affirmation of the plane) for the composition’.323 This 
rivalry, however, is nothing but ‘the particular shaping of a fundamental antithesis’,324 
and this is enough to show that ‘the non-artistic foundation of the problems limits only 
their applicability, but certainly not their meaning’,325 and that, therefore, one cannot talk 
about ‘special’ problems326 but only problems ‘applied in a special way’.327 And this is 
because - as we have already seen - ‘the antitheses as such are employed in their basic 
meaning [...]. But then,’ - as Wind asks - ‘where are the really special problems to be 
found?’.328
For this reason, it often happens that, ‘instead of a representational or thematic 
condition, a concrete morphological figure is chosen as the ‘representative of value’’,
 
329 
as for instance in Frankl’s statement: ‘Column and wall are opposites’.330 Although for 
the art historian such a statement is absolutely normal, it still reveals a paradoxicality 
on the logical level, related to the possibility of ‘putting two concrete constructions 
against one another’.331 In order to explain how this might be possible, Wind uses the 
verb verkörpern (to embody)332 and affirms that ‘it is the values embodied in the 
constructions which are put against one another - not the constructions themselves’.333 
From this, a complication derives: a concrete figure (konkrete Gestalt) - a concrete 
morphological figure (konkrete morphologische Gestalt) as, for instance, a column - is not 
so much a pure representative of the single value (Wert), as it contains in itself a 
determined balance of an antithetical conflict. So, for instance, if a concrete figure is set 
up against another concrete figure (einer anderen konkreten Gestalt) - as against the mass 
of a wall with a determined conformation (Ausformung) - we relate two opposite solutions 
and obtain therefore a new problem that requires reconciliation and ‘solution’.334
 
322‘zugleich ist aber äußere Porträtähnlichkeit gefordert’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’. 456. 
 This 
problem, i.e. this antithetical opposition, however ‘is no longer a fundamental one, but 
323‘muß sich eine Rivalität ergeben zwischen der »ungebundenen« Auffassung und dem »gestellten Bild«: 
Für die psychologische Charakteristik der Figuren bedeutet das einen Konflikt zwischen 
»Aufmerksamkeit« und »Willensäußerung«, für die Komposition einen Widerstreit zwischen loser 
Vertikalreihung (d.h. Aufhebung der Ebenenrelationen) und Bindung durch ein normales Schema (d.h. 
Bejahung der Ebene), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’. 457. 
324‘die besondere Ausformung einer Grundantithese’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
325‘die außerkünstlerische Fundierung der Probleme nur deren Anwendbarkeit eingrenzt, aber nicht recht 
eigentlich ihren Sinn’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
326Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
327Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
328‘die Antithesen als solche werden in ihrer grundlegenden Bedeutung herangezogen [...]. Wo sind aber 
dann wahrhaft spezielle Probleme anzutreffen?’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
329‘statt einer gegenständlichen oder thematischen Vorbedingung eine konkrete morphologische Gestalt 
zum »Wertrepräsentanten« gewählt wird’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
330‘»Stütze und Wand sind Gegensätze«’, quoted in Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
331‘zwei konkrete Gebilde gegeneinander auszuspielen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
332The first time Wind used this term was in his doctoral dissertation, almost always in the same sense as 
here. See Edgar Wind, Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand, 23, 25, 26, 31, 32 and, in 
particular, 197 where Wind proposes the same thesis as here. 
333‘es sind die in den Gebilden verkörperten Werte, die man gegeneinander kontrastiert, - nicht die Gebilde 
selbst’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
334Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
 
  46 
absolutely special’;335 ‘it can only be considered as a particular condition of a determined 
representation and not as a universal condition of the ‘forming in general’’.336 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that this problem too, this really special337
 
 problem, can be 
reduced to general antitheses, since each one of the poles which compose it can still be 
resolved in turn by an elementary antithesis:  
‘column’ and ‘wall’ - which we put in a mutual antithesis - already 
contain, respectively, a determined balance between optical and haptical 
values. In exactly the same way even the composition-scheme of the triangle, 
which in certain phases of northern painting ‘competes’ with the tonal spatial 
values, derives from a contrast between surface and depth. It is established, in 
this way, that the really special problems carry a complex character and are to 
be resolved into elementary components. In this sense, every historically 
conditioned problem can be reduced to a supra-historical one, every evolutionary 
polarity can be reduced to a systematic one. So, we reach the conclusion that it is 
precisely on the particular problems that the basic antitheses prove themselves 
as ‘final authorities’. The ‘concrete problems’ by in themselves point back to a 
‘systematic ready network of questions’.338
 
 
It is precisely these Windian considerations which fully recover the sense of 
Wind’s kunstwissenschaftlich approach and substantiate the sense and the importance of 
the transcendental reflection he introduced with his Zur Systematik der künstlerischen 
Probleme. At the same time, if one looks at the developments in Wind’s thought after 
1925, it is precisely these last considerations339 that seem to be somehow connected to 
the new Windian thesis which will arrive only one year later, in 1926, on the occasion 
of a lecture Wind gave in the USA, at Harvard.340
 
335‘ist kein grundlegendes mehr, sondern ein durchaus spezielles’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
 Here, in Zur Systematik der 
künstlerischen Probleme, as I have shown, a reflection on both the specification 
(Spezifizierung) of the artistic problems and the difficulty in dealing with the manifold 
artworks justifies for Wind a resort to the ideal instruments for the investigation of the 
artistic reality. Later, it is precisely this problematic relationship between the 
concreteness of the reality to be investigated and the ideality of the investigative tools which 
appears under a different light and becomes for Wind a new question: the need to 
determine the sense of the relationship between empirics and theory starting from a 
336‘es kann nur als besondere Voraussetzung einer bestimmten Gestaltung, nicht als allgemeine Voraussetzung 
der »Gestaltung überhaupt« angesehen werden’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
337Since it is not based on a non-artistic foundation, unlike the special problems already examined above. 
See supra and Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457. 
338‘»Säule« und »Wand«, die wir antithetisch einander gegenübergestellt haben, schließen schon jedes 
einen bestimmten Ausgleich zwischen optischen und haptischen Werten in sich. Und ebenso ist z. B. das 
Kompositionsschema des Dreiecks, das in bestimmten Phasen der nordischen Malerei mit den tonigen 
Raumwerten »rivalisiert«, selbst aus einer Auseinandersetzung zwischen Fläche und Tiefe 
hervorgegangen. Damit stellt sich heraus, daß die wahrhaft speziellen Probleme komplexen Charakter 
tragen und in elementare Bestandteile aufzulösen sind. Jedes historisch bedingte Problem läßt sich in diesem 
Sinne auf ein überhistorisches, jede entwicklungsgeschichtliche Polarität auf eine systematische zurückführen. 
Wir kommen also zu dem Schluß, daß gerade an den speziellen Problemen die grundlegenden Antithesen 
sich als »letzte Instanzen« bewähren. Die »konkreten Probleme« weisen von sich aus auf ein »systematisch 
bereitetes Netz von Fragen« zurück’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457-458. 
339Which are also present in Wind’s doctoral dissertation - see supra. 
340Edgar Wind, ‘Experiment and Metaphysics’, 217-224. Consolato Latella      Wind and Riegl:  ...  a ‘problematical’ grammar 
 
  47 
redefinition of the meaning of investigative tools and experiment. So, if compared with 
the theory of the embodiment (or Verkörperung) formulated by Wind shortly afterwards 
in Experiment and Metaphysics,341
 
 his particular use of the verb verkörpern (to embody) in 
Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, and his interest in both determining the final 
authorities (letzte Instanzen) and investigating the problematic role of the concrete 
individual element in comparison with the theoretical element, seem to anticipate the 
direction of his following meditation. In this sense, I believe that, although the theories 
and the solutions which Wind developed from 1926 onwards are unlikely to be found 
in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, it is certainly reasonable to maintain that 
in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme Wind still localized at least a specific 
underlying question: the relationship between ideal a priori structures and the data of 
experience. It is precisely to this problem, perhaps implicitly acknowledging the limits 
of his own earlier solution, that he tries to find a different answer by means of the new 
philosophical theories he got to know during his stay in the U.S.A, where he became 
acquainted with the thought of Peirce and Lewis and with the experimental method of 
contemporary physics. 
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341And, then, in Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. As I shall show in the following section, the very 
foundation of Wind’s theory of the Verkörperung must certainly be detected in his conference paper of 
1926: Edgar Wind, ‘Experiment and Metaphysics’, 217-224. See also Edgar Wind, Das Experiment und die 
Metaphysik, 1934 and 2001, English transl.: Edgar Wind, Experiment and Metaphysics, 2001. 